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Is "USDA ORGANIC" A SEAL OF
DECEIT?: THE PITFALLS OF USDA
CERTIFIED ORGANICS PRODUCED IN
THE UNITED STATES, CHINA AND
BEYOND
CHENGLIN LIu*
American consumers' appetite for organic foods (organics) has
dramatically increased since Congress passed the Organic Foods Production
Act (OFPA) in 1990. Because the domestic organic food industry has been
unable to meet the growing demand for these products, US. groceries have
increasingly relied on imported organics. Studies show that 40% of organic
foods consumed in the United States are imported from over 100 foreign
countries.
To regulate organic food production, the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) accredits certifying agents, which in turn certify organic
farms and handlers according to US. organic standards. Certifying agents
can be state agencies or private enterprises, including foreign entities. In
2007, USDA-accredited agents certified 27,000 organic producers
worldwide. This certification allows approved foreign products to bear the
"USDA Organic" seal and freely enter the US. market.
This article evaluates the trustworthiness of the USDA organic
certification process. By using China as an example, the article offers a
comparative assessment of the quality and safety of both domestically
produced and Chinese produced organics in the US. market. In addition, the
article discusses the USDA's failure to keep pace with the supervision of
certifying agents, especially in China and other foreign countries. The article
concludes that the current regulatory framework is not only inadequate to the
task of regulating domestic organics, but also incapable of ensuring the
integrity of imported organics. Thus, the "USDA Organic" seal misleads
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I. INTRODUCTION
American consumers' appetite for organics has dramatically increased
since Congress passed the Organic Foods Production Act (OFPA) in 1990.' In
2008, organic food sales reached $21.1 billion in the U.S market, which is more
than five times greater than the sales figures from 1997.2 The U.S. domestic
organic food industry, however, has fallen far short of meeting the increasing
demand for organic food.' As a result, U.S. groceries have increasingly relied on
organic production from foreign countries. As much as 40% of organic foods
consumed in the United States are imported from over 100 countries.' In 2008, an
ABC News report revealed that Whole Foods, the undisputed leader in organic
foods known for promoting its products as "locally grown," sold organic products
produced in China, including spinach, sugar snap peas, asparagus spears, pine nuts,
and creamy peanut butter.' The Cornucopia Institute estimated that in 2009 up to
50% of organic soybeans consumed in the United States were produced in China.
Facing a shortage of U.S. grown soybeans, leading soy-based food manufacturers,
such as Dean Foods, have switched their sources to imports from China.'
The U.S. regulatory scheme on organics is based on the OFPA,9 which
delegates to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) the task of regulating
organic production, handling, and labeling.'o In 2002, the USDA promulgated the
National Organic Program (NOP) to enforce the OFPA." According to the OFPA,
the USDA itself does not conduct field reviews and inspections. Rather, it accredits
certifying agents to certify and monitor organic farms and handlers pursuant to the
organic standards defined in the OFPA and NOP.12 Certifying agents can be state
agricultural departments or private entities, including foreign entities." In 2007,
USDA-accredited agents certified 27,000 organic producers and handlers
1 Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3935 (codified as amended at
7 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6523 (2006)).
2 CATHERINE GREENE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., ECONOMIC
INFORMATION BULLETIN NO. 55, EMERGING ISSUES IN THE U.S. ORGANIC INDUSTRY 3 (2009),
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/eib55/eib55.pdf.
' Id. at 3-5.
4 Bryan Endres, An Awkward Adolescence in the Organics Industry: Coming to Terms with Big
Organics and Other Legal Challenges for the Industry's Next Ten Years, 12 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 17,
35 (2007).
s GREENE ET AL., supra note 2, at 8.
6 WJLA/NewsChannel 8, ABC 7 I-Team Investigates: Organic Foods, ABC 7 NEWS (WJLA-TV), May
21, 2008, http://www.wjla.com/news/stories/0508/521743.html.
7 CORNUCOPIA INSTITUTE, BEHIND THE BEAN: THE HEROES AND CHARLATANS OF THE NATURAL
AND ORGANIC Soy FOODS INDUSTRY 17 (2009), available at
http://www.comucopia.org/soysurvey/OrganicSoyReport/behindthebean-color-final.pdf.
8 Id.
Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3935 (codified as amended at
7 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6523 (2006)).
'o Id. § 6503.
National Organic Program, 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.669 (2011).
12 7 U.S.C. § 6506.
1 7 C.F.R. § 205.500(a): "The Administrator shall accredit a qualified domestic or foreign applicant in
the areas of crops, livestock, wild crops, or handling or any combination thereof to certify a domestic or
foreign production or handling operation as a certified operation."
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worldwide, 11,000 of which were outside of the U.S.14 This method of certification
means that USDA certified products from foreign countries are entitled to bear the
USDA Organic Seal and circulate freely in the U.S. market.
How does the USDA regulate domestically produced organics? How can
the USDA rigorously enforce the same standards on both foreign organic certifying
agencies and producers in over one hundred countries? What are the obstacles the
USDA faces in regulating both domestic and foreign organic products consumed in
the U.S. market? Using China as an example, this article offers a comparative
assessment of the quality and safety of both domestically produced and Chinese
produced organics in the U.S. market.
Part II of the article examines the development of the U.S. regulatory
framework for organics and the challenges facing the USDA in enforcing U.S.
organic standards on imported foods. Part III explores the Chinese laws and
regulations for food safety and organic production, and China's serious challenges
in regulating organic food, including fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest,
environmental degradation, and lack of incentives for long term agricultural
investment. Part IV discusses the signaling function of the USDA accreditation and
certification system from a theoretical perspective. The OFPA was designed to
establish a national standard and prevent consumer confusion. Apparently, the law
did not anticipate the deep impact that globalization would have on organic trade in
the United States just two decades later. While the USDA has significantly
expanded its presence by accrediting foreign certifying agents throughout the
world, it has failed to keep up with the supervision of those agents. The article
concludes that the current regulatory framework is not only inadequate to the task
of regulating domestic organics, but also incapable of ensuring the integrity of
imported organics. Thus, the "USDA Organic" seal on imported organics misleads
consumers.
II. THE U.S. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR ORGANICS
A. Development
Jerome Rodale is widely credited for pioneering the organic movement in
the United States." Influenced by Sir Albert Howard and Ehrenfied Pfeiffer,
Rodale firmly believed that organic farming would produce healthier foods while
preserving soil fertility. 6 He vividly "likened chemical fertilizers to whipping a
horse, speeding up growth but hastening tiredness."" In 1942, Rodale published the
Organic Farming Magazine, which provided a platform for spreading his belief in
14 GREENE ET AL., supra note 2, at iii.
'5 See PHILIP CONFORD, THE ORIGINS OF THE ORGANIC MOVEMENT 100 (2001); SAMUEL FROMARTZ,
ORGANIC, INC.: NATURAL FOODS AND How THEY GREW 20 (2006); Michelle T. Friedland, You Call
That Organic?-The USDA's Misleading Food Regulations, 13 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 379, 381 (2005);
Kyle W. Lathrop, Pre-empting Apples with Oranges: Federal Regulation of Organic Food Labeling, 16
J. CORP. L. 885, 886 (1991).
6 FROMARTZ, supra note 15, at 20.
7 Id.
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organic food and distaste of chemically induced agriculture.' 8  Even though
Rodale's ideas were met with skepticism, resistance, and even ridicule," organic
farming gradually gained momentum through his persistent efforts. Around the
same time, the U.S. government began to evaluate the ruinous consequences of
modem farming in its influential report entitled "Soils and Men."20
In the early 1970s, Rodale's followers began to market products labeled as
"organic."" Organics soon became popular with consumers who were concerned
with the use of agrochemicals. Due to a lack of regulation, however, some farmers
allegedly mislabeled their conventionally grown products as organics to deceive
consumers.22 In response, Oregon enacted the first organic certification law in
1973.23 By 1990, twenty-two states had passed laws on organic standards and
certification requirements.24 State laws helped to create an orderly organic market
within each individual state, but differences in these state laws provided no
uniformity for a national organic market. The discrepancies not only hampered
interstate commerce but also caused enormous consumer confusion.25 For example,
to market organic milk, laws in New Hampshire and Texas required dairy cows to
be fed exclusively with organic feed, while Kansas and other states had less
stringent requirements.26 The divergent standards forced organic farmers to create
different labels and adjust farm operations for sales in different markets.27 In
addition, conflicting standards made it difficult for American farmers to export
organics to other countries.28 As a result, organic farmers, certification agents, and
organic trade associations called for Congress to establish a national organic
certification program.29 Against this background, Congress enacted the Organic
Foods Production Act of 1990 (OFPA).3 Since then, the OFPA has served three
purposes: "(1) to establish national standards for organically produced products; (2)
to assure consumers that organically produced products meet a consistent national
standard; and (3) to facilitate interstate commerce of organically produced
products."'
18 Id. For a brief biography of Mr. Rodale, see J. 1. Rodale and the Rodale Family Celebrating 50
Years as Advocates for Sustainable Agriculture, available at
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt?open=514&objID=588386&mode=2 (last visited April
22,2011).
'9 Id.; see also Friedland, supra note 15, at 381.
20 FROMARTZ, supra note 15, at 19.
21 Lathrop, supra note 15, at 886.
22 Friedland, supra note 15, at 381-82.
23 Id. at 382.




28 Id. at 4944.
29 Id.
30 Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3935 (codified as amended
at 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6523 (2006)).
3 Id. § 6501.
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B. Overview of the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990
1. Defining "Organic"
The OFPA takes a production-based approach to its regulation of the
organic industry." Under this approach, the OFPA sets forth certain methods that
organic farmers and handlers must either follow or avoid. That is, instead of
focusing on the end results of production, the Act emphasizes adherence to standard
production and handling processes. However, the Senate report detailing the
legislative intent of the OFPA conceded that "[o]rganically produced food defies
simple definition."" As a result, the OFPA broadly defines organically produced
food as "an agricultural product that is produced and handled in accordance with
[the Act]."34 In essence, the OFPA regulates organic production processes and not
the actual products themselves.
To comply with these national standards, organic farmers and handlers
must not only produce foods without the use of synthetic chemicals but also refrain
from applying synthetic chemicals "during the [three] years immediately preceding
the harvest of [organic] products."" In addition, they must comply with an "organic
plan" agreed upon with their certifying agents." Yet, the seemingly strict standards
for organic production are undermined by exceptions in the OFPA, which allow for
the use of certain synthetic substances in organically produced products."
Therefore, products bearing the "USDA Organic" seal that were produced in
accordance with the OFPA may not be completely free of synthetic chemical
residue. As a former Vice-Chair of the U.S. National Organic Standards Board
(NOSB), Mr. William J. Friedman, explained, "Organic labels are not statements
regarding the healthiness, nutritional value, or overall safety of consuming such
products.""
2. The National List
The OFPA authorizes the USDA to promulgate a "National List" of
synthetic chemicals that are allowed for use in organic production." Because the
use of synthetic chemicals in the production of organic food necessarily involves
conflicting interests between organic producers and consumers, the OFPA
prescribes a cautious approach for the USDA to determine what substances make
the National List. Accordingly, the Secretary of the USDA must consult with both
32 See Friedland, supra note 15, at 388.
3 S. REP. No. 101-357, at 292 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4943, 4946.
34 7 U.S.C. § 6502(14).
Id. § 6504(2).
36 Id. § 6504(3).
Id. §§ 6504(2), 6517; see also The National List of Allowed and Prohibited Substances, 7 C.F.R.
205.600 (2011).
38 William J. Friedman, The Framework For Global Organic Food Trade Circa 2005:
Accomplishments and Challenges, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 361, 366 (2005).
7 U.S.C. § 6517 (2006); see also 7 C.F.R. § 205.600 (2010).
338 47:333
Is "USDA ORGANIC" A Seal of Deceit?
the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to amend this list of permissible synthetic chemicals.40
More importantly, the USDA must ensure that such chemicals will not be harmful
to human health, and are necessary to and consistent with organic production
practices. 41 In addition, such chemicals must either fall within a category of
acceptable substances enumerated in the Act, or not be classified by the EPA as
"inerts of toxicological concern." 3
Furthermore, the OFPA established the NOSB to propose changes for the
National List to the USDA."" The NOSB is composed of fifteen members
representing a balance of interests in the areas of organic production, consumer
protection, and environmental protection.45 The USDA's decisions concerning the
list must be based on NOSB proposals because the OFPA does not authorize the
USDA to add synthetic substances to the list on its own initiative." To ensure
transparency, the OFPA requires that the USDA publish proposed changes in the
Federal Register and seek public comments before amending the National List.47
Similarly, once the USDA finalizes a new version of the National List, it must be
published in the Federal Register along with any public comments made regarding
the changes.48 Currently, the National List allows over sixty synthetic substances to
be used in organic crop production. 9
3. The National Organic Program (NOP)
The regulation of organic standards takes several steps and involves several
layers of administrative offices within the USDA. First, Congress delegated the
administration of the OFPA to the USDA. 0 In turn, the USDA delegated the
functions of the Act to its sub-agency, the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS)."
One of the functions of the AMS is to ensure that "organically produced products
meet uniform standards and that they are appropriately labeled."52 To administer
the national organic standards, the USDA created the National Organic Program
(NOP)." The term "NOP" is used to refer both to the organization that administers
40 7 U.S.C. § 6517(c)(1)(A).
41 Id. § 6517(c)(1)(A)(i),(ii).
42 Id. § 6517(b); see also 7 C.F.R. § 205.600.
4' 7 U.S.C. § 6517(c)(1)(B)(ii).
44 Id.§ 6518.
45 Id. § 6518(b).
46 Id. § 6518(k)(2).
47 Id. § 6517(d)(4).
48 Id. § 6517(d)(5).
49 7 C.F.R. § 205.601 (2011)
'o 7 U.S.C. § 6521 (2011).
s' OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., OVERSIGHT OF THE NATIONAL ORGANIC
PROGRAM, AUDIT REPORT 01601-03-Hy 5 (2010), available at
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/01601-03-HY.pdf.
52 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AUDIT REPORT No. 01001-02-HY, AGRIC.
MKTG. SERV.'S NATIONAL ORGANIC PROGRAM (2005), at i, available at
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/01001-02-HY.pdf.
13 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AUDIT REPORT 01601-03-HY, supra note 51, at
5.
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the national organic standards (the NOP Office) as well as the rules themselves
(the NOP regulations)." The NOP Office leads and oversees all of the activities of
the NOP, which is further supported by three organizational units: the Standards
Division, the Accreditation and International Activities Division, and the
Compliance and Enforcement Division. 6
4. Accreditation and Certification
To ensure that organic farmers and handlers comply with national organic
standards, the OFPA provides for a two-tier regulatory scheme of accreditation"
and certification." The USDA first accredits certifying agents, which can be either
governing state officials or private persons." In turn, the accredited agents certify
applicants as organic producers or handlers who, in compliance with the OFPA, can
sell or label their products as "organically produced."o
For USDA accreditation, a prospective agent must have expertise in
organic farming and handling, although an advanced degree in a scientific
discipline is not necessary.6  To further ensure a high degree of integrity and
consistency among certifying agents, the OFPA provides that the USDA may
establish a peer review committee consisting of persons with expertise in organic
farming and handling methods.62 Unfortunately, in the two decades since enactment
of the OFPA, the USDA has never formed such a peer review committee. When
approved, an agent's accreditation lasts five years and may be renewed as long as
the agent demonstrates the ability, and sufficiently trained personnel, to comply
with the law.' The OFPA requires an agent to conduct annual performance
evaluations of all persons who review certification applications, perform and
document on-site certifications, or make certification decisions.65  The agent must
also maintain certification records for USDA inspection66 and, except for business
related information, provide public access to certification documents and
54 For a detailed description of the NOP as an administrative office, see AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC., NATIONAL ORGANIC PROGRAM ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 1-2 (July 13, 2010),
available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSvl.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5086500.
s See 7 C.F.R. § 205.1-205.699 (2011).
56 AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., NATIONAL ORGANIC PROGRAM STRATEGIC PLAN 1
(Aug. 2010), available at
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSvl.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5086491.




S. REP. NO. 101-357, at 294 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4943, 4948.
62 Id
6 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AUDIT REPORT 01601-03-HY, supra note 51, at
3 ("We found that NOP officials did not assemble a peer review panel to annually evaluate their
accreditation procedures.").
6 National Organic Program, 7 C.F.R. § 205.501(a)(l)-(5) (2011).
6s Id. § 205.501(a)(6).
6 Id. § § 205.501(a)(9).
61 Id. § 205.501(a)(9}-(10).
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laboratory analyses that pertain to certifications.
Under the OFPA, an operation that applies for organic certification pays an
accredited agent for inspection and certification.6 ' To prevent conflicts of interest,
the OFPA sets forth strict rules to govern the relationship between an accredited
agent and its client.70 Thus, an accredited agent must not have a commercial
interest in an operation that it inspects, including the provision of consultancy
services." An agent must also not accept gifts or favors of any kind from the
operation the agent inspects.72 The Act further prohibits an agent from charging its
client a fee for advice on proper organic practices or technologies to use."
5. Organic Products and Labeling
Table 1: Organic Labeling Types and Requirements
Type, and Content The USDA Certifying
Requirement Seal Agent Logo
100% Organic Yes Yes
Organic (>95%) Yes Yes
Made with organic (70% No Yes
to 95%)
<70% No No
Under the applicable regulations, there are three layers of organic products:
(1) 100% organic, (2) organic, and (3) made with organic.74 A product sold as
"100% organic" must contain (by weight or fluid volume, excluding water and salt)
100% organically produced ingredients." A 100% organic product may display on
its packaging the certifying agent's logo and the USDA seal." A product sold as
"organic" must contain (by weight or fluid volume, excluding water and salt) not
less than 95% organically produced raw or processed agricultural products.77 An
organic product may also display on its packaging the certifying agent's logo and
6" 7 U.S.C. § 6505(a)(9) (2006).
69 Id. § 6506(a)(10).
70 Id. § 6514(h).
Id. § 6514(h)(1).
" Id. § 6514(h)(2).
7 Id. § 6514(h)(3).
74 See National Organic Program, 7 C.F.R. § 205.30 1(a)c) (2011).
Id. § 205.301(a).
7 Id. § 205.303(a)(1).
n Id. § 205.301(b).
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the USDA seal." A product sold as "made with organic," specifying which
ingredients are organic, must contain (by weight or fluid volume, excluding water
and salt) at least 70% organically produced ingredients." A product made with
organic ingredients may display on its packaging the certifying agent's logo but not
the USDA seal. 0
6. Penalties
If a certified operation knowingly sells or labels a product as organic when
it is not in compliance with the OFPA, the operation is subject to suspension or
revocation of its organic certification." An operation whose certification has been
revoked becomes ineligible to receive certification for a period of five years
following the date of revocation." In addition, such an operation can be assessed a
civil penalty of up to $10,000 per violation." If an operation knowingly makes a
false statement to the USDA or its certifying agent regarding its compliance with
organic regulations, it is subject to a criminal penalty of up to five years
imprisonment.' Penalties for a nonconforming certifying agent, however, are more
lenient. If a certifying agent willfully violates the OFPA or the NOP, the maximum
penalty is revocation or suspension of its accreditation." A certifying agent whose
accreditation has been revoked becomes ineligible to receive accreditation as a
certifying agent for a period of up to three years following the date of revocation.
C. Challenges for Enforcing the OFPA and the NOP Regulations?
1. Harvey v. Veneman and the 2005 OFPA Amendments
The USDA's eventual promulgation of the NOP raised significant
concerns. In 2003, Arthur Harvey, a producer, handler, and consumer of organic
crops, filed a lawsuit against the USDA alleging that several provisions of the NOP
diluted the national organic standards established by the OFPA and thus violated
the Act." Harvey further alleged that he suffered individualized harm as a result of
the weakened integrity of organic standards and degraded quality of organically
Id. § 205.303(a)(1).
Id. § 205.301(c)(2).
80 Id. § 205.303(c).
' Id. § 205.662(g)(1).
Id. § 205.662(f)(2).
8 7 U.S.C. § 6519 (2006); see also 7 C.F.R. § 205.662(g)(1).
' 7 C.F.R. § 205.662(g)(2); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006).
85 7 C.F.R. § 205.665(d)-(g).
86 Id. § 205.665(g)(2).
87 Kimberly Kindy, USDA's Deputy Secretary Discusses Challenges for Organic Food Market, WASH.
POST, Apr. 6, 2010, at All, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/04/05/AR2010040504599_pf.html.
88 Harvey v. Veneman (Harvey 1), 396 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 2005).
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labeled foods caused by the NOP." Among his seven claims, Harvey challenged
two parts of the NOP that permitted synthetic substances to be used in processed
organic foods." The court agreed with Harvey that the OFPA only permitted
"certain synthetic substances during production or growing of organic products, but
not during the handling and processing stages."9' Accordingly, the court concluded
that these challenged NOP provisions were inconsistent with the plain language of
the OFPA9 2 and the USDA exceeded its authority to permit the use of synthetic
material in the handling or processing of organic food.93
Harvey also argued that the NOP provision regarding the conversion of
dairy herds to organic production was inconsistent with the OFPA. Specifically,
the OFPA required that a dairy farm maintain a mandatory twelve month period of
94100% organic feed for its herds prior to selling or labeling its products as organic,
whereas the NOP provision only required 80% organic feed during the first nine
89 Id.
90 Id. at 33. The two provisions that Harvey challenged were 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.600(b) & 205.605(b).
§ 205.600 Evaluation criteria for allowed and prohibited substances, methods, and ingredients.
The following criteria will be utilized in the evaluation of substances or ingredients for the
organic production and handling sections of the National List:
I .. I1
(b) In addition to the criteria set forth in the Act, any synthetic substance used as a
processing aid or adjuvant will be evaluated against the following criteria:
(1) The substance cannot be produced from a natural source and there are no organic
substitutes;
(2) The substance's manufacture, use, and disposal do not have adverse effects on the
environment and are done in a manner compatible with organic handling;
(3) The nutritional quality of the food is maintained when the substance is used, and the
substance, itself, or its breakdown products do not have an adverse effect on human health as
defined by applicable Federal regulations;
(4) The substance's primary use is not as a preservative or to recreate or improve flavors,
colors, textures, or nutritive value lost during processing, except where the replacement of
nutrients is required by law;
(5) The substance is listed as generally recognized as safe (GRAS) by Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) when used in accordance with FDA's good manufacturing practices
(GMP) and contains no residues of heavy metals or other contaminants in excess of
tolerances set by FDA; and
(6) The substance is essential for the handling of organically produced agricultural products.
§ 205.605 Nonagricultural (nonorganic) substances allowed as ingredients in or on processed products
labeled as "organic" or "made with organic (specified ingredients or food group(s))."
The following nonagricultural substances may be used as ingredients in or on processed products
labeled as "organic" or "made with organic (specified ingredients or food group(s))" only in accordance
with any restrictions specified in this section.
91 Before the amendment in 1991, 7 U.S.C. § 6517 provided that:
The national list may provide for the use of substances in an organic farming or handling
operation that are otherwise prohibited under this title only if...
(B) the substance-
is used in production and contains an active synthetic ingredient in the following
categories ...
is use in production and contains synthetic inert ingredients that are not classified by the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency as inerts of toxicological concern; or
is used in handling and i[s] non-synthetic but is not organically produced ....
92 Harvey I, 396 F.3d at 40.
9 Id. at 39.
9 The OFPA provides: "[A] dairy animal from which milk or milk products will be sold or labeled as
organically produced shall be raised and handled in accordance with this chapter for not less than the
12-month period immediately prior to the sale of such milk and milk products." 7 U.S.C. § 6509(e)(2).
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months and 100% organic feed for the final three months.5  Thus, Harvey
challenged that the NOP provision substantially reduced the organic standards for
milk or milk products." While admitting to the deviation of the NOP from the
OFPA requirement regarding dairy herd conversion, the USDA argued that it had
the discretion to create an exception for the conversion requirement on which the
OFPA remained silent.97 The court disagreed with the USDA and ruled that,
because the OFPA had already set forth clear requirements for dairy conversion,
"the [USDA] may not promulgate a regulation directly at odds with those statutory
requirements."" In the end, the USDA reached a settlement agreement with
Harvey, which included a promise not to permit the use of synthetic ingredients in
the processing of organic products.99
Harvey's victory, however, was short lived. Soon after the court ruled in
Harvey's favor, Congress reacted with the passage of OFPA amendments in
2005.'" In essence, the 2005 amendments overruled Harvey I and made the
challenged NOP provisions legitimate. Specifically, the amendments made three
significant changes. First, they extended the permissible use of synthetic
substances on the National List to the handling and processing of organic
products.'' Second, they granted the USDA authority to add any synthetic
ingredient to the National List for use not only in organic production but also in the
handling and processing of organic products. 02 Third, they stated that "crops and
forage from land included in the organic system plan of a dairy farm that is in the
third year of organic management may be consumed by the dairy animals of the
farm during the 12-month period immediately prior to the sale of organic milk and
milk products.,"' Therefore, dairy cows could be given feed that would not qualify
as organic products and their milk could still be sold and labeled as organically
produced.104
Despite the amendments, Harvey mounted yet another legal challenge to
the NOP and tried to enforce the USDA's previous promise to prevent the use of
Harvey 1, 396 F.3d at 43: When the entire, distinct herd is converted to organic production, the
producer may:
For the first 9 months of the year, provide a minimum of 80-percent feed that is either
organic or raised from land included in the organic system plan and managed in compliance
with organic crop requirements; and
Provide feed in compliance with § 205.237 for the final 3 months.
96 Id
9 Id at 43.
9' Id. at 44.
9 Harvey v. Johanns (Harvey l), 494 F.3d. 237, 239 (1st Cir. 2007).
'0 Id. at 239.
"o' Id. at 239-40.
102 Id.
103 Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-97, § 797, 119 Stat. 2120, 2165 (2005), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 109_cong_public laws&docid=f:pubIO97.109.
" The NOP regulations state: "Any field or farm parcel from which harvested crops are intended to be
sold, labeled, or represented as 'organic,' must: ... (b) Have had no prohibited substances, as listed in
§ 205.105, applied to it for a period of 3 years immediately preceding harvest of the crop; and. . . ." 7
C.F.R. § 205.202 (2011). Thus, crops and forage in the third year of transition to organic farming are
not organic products.
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synthetic ingredients in the processing of organic products."o' This time, however,
Harvey predicated his case on linguistic rather than legal grounds, alleging that the
choice of words in the 2005 amendments still supported his claims.'" Refusing to
play this word game, the court ruled in the USDA's favor after a short
deliberation.'07 Indeed, the court humorously reasoned that the 2005 amendments
had already pulled "the legs out from under" Harvey I." In light of how these new
changes were made to the OFPA, the NOP is likely to withstand any similar
challenges in the future.
2. Massachusetts Independent Certification, Inc. v. Johanns
The case of Massachusetts Independent Certification, Inc. (MICI) v.
Johanns09 marked another setback for consumers of organic products whose
reliance on the integrity of organic standards necessarily depends on organic
certifiers' rigorous enforcement of the OFPA and the NOP. MICI was a private
organic certifier accredited by the USDA."o In 2002, The Country Hen applied to
MICI for organic certification of its egg-farming operation."' After inspecting The
Country Hen's facilities, MICI found "four areas of noncompliance, including [a]
failure to provide hens with access to the outdoors as required by NOP
regulations."" 2 In fact, "[u]nknown to MICI, The Country Hen had previously
applied for organic certification [from] another certification agent, which rejected
the application on the same grounds ultimately cited by MICI.""' MICI issued a
notice of noncompliance and gave The Country Hen three months to take corrective
actions."4 Shortly after the inspection, The Country Hen submitted to MICI a plan
for providing outdoor access to its hens."' However, MICI concluded that the
proposed plan was inadequate under NOP regulations and issued a notice of denial
of certification.' 6
During the time it applied to MICI for organic certification, The Country
Hen also submitted a proposed egg carton bearing the "USDA Organic" seal to a
NOP program manager."7 The Country Hen claimed its operation, feed, and eggs
were "certified organic by NOFA/Mass.""' Without consulting with MICI, the
NOP program manager approved the egg carton before MICI denied The Country
Hen's application."9
105 Harvey v. Johanns (Harvey II), 494 F.3d. 237 (1st Cir. 2007).
106 Id. at 241.
107 Unlike in Harvey I, the Court did not elaborate on its decision in Harvey II.
'os Id. at 241.
10 Mass. Indep. Certification, Inc. v. Johanns (MIC1), 486 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D. Mass. 2007).







"' Id. at 113.
"' Id. at 112.
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The Country Hen appealed MICI's decision to deny its organic
certification application to the USDA Administrator for the Agriculture Marketing
Service (AMS).'20 Three days later, the AMS Administrator sustained the appeal
and directed MICI to grant certification to The Country Hen.' MICI refused to
follow AMS's instruction.'22 Nevertheless, The Country Hen quickly released to
market its eggs packed in cartons bearing the "USDA Organic" seal and a statement
that The Country Hen, its eggs, and feed were "certified organic by
NOFA/Mass.""' MICI repeatedly demanded that The Country Hen stop claiming it
was NOFA/Mass certified.2 4 The Country Hen, however, continued to use the label
until it obtained an organic certification from another certifier several months
later.125
MICI's efforts to repeal The Country Hen's organic certification were
persistent. The certifier filed a complaint with both the USDA Office of
Administrative Law Judges and the USDA Judicial Officer, seeking to overturn the
Administrator's decision to grant organic certification to The Country Hen.2 6 MICI
alleged that the USDA had violated the requirements of due process by granting
direct certification regardless of a certifier's objections.'27 Both offices dismissed
MICI's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction."' Afterwards, MICI
brought a civil action against the USDA seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
from the NOP regulations that apparently denied MICI a right to an administrative
appeal of USDA certification decisions. 9
After applying the analytical framework established in Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc', the Court concluded the NOP
regulations were not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute, and
ruled against MICI''
The MICI court may have skillfully applied the Chevron test and properly
denied certifying agents a right to appeal USDA decisions. The case itself,
however, reveals a serious flaw in the existing certification process. Under the
OFPA and the NOP, certifying agents are the first reviewers of applications for
120 Id. at 113.
t21 id.
122 Id ("On October 28, 2002, MICI sent a letter to the Administrator objecting both to the procedure
followed in deciding The Country Hen's appeal and the substance of the October 25 decision. After
receiving no response, MICI filed a complaint with the USDA Office of Administrative Law Judges,









130 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In Chevron, the
Supreme Court set forth a two-step analysis for reviewing an agency's statutory interpretation. The
first step is to determine "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." Id. at
842. If Congress's intent is clear, then the second step is to determine whether the regulation "give[s]
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Id. at 843. If Congress's intent is
ambiguous, however, then the second step is to give the regulation "controlling weight unless it is
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Id. at 844.
1' See MICI, 486, F. Supp. 2d at 119-120.
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organic certification.132 If a certifying agent denies an applicant's certification, the
applicant has a right to appeal the decision to the USDA.' If the USDA sustains
the appeal, the applicant can market its products as certified organic, bearing the
"USDA Organic" seal.13 4 Even if the certifying agent has sufficient reasons to
disagree with the USDA decision, it does not have a right to administratively appeal
the decision or even, according to the holding in MCI, to challenge the decision in
court.
This critical exclusion of certifying agents essentially strips consumers of a
necessary layer of protection from substandard or bogus organic products. When
Congress enacted the OFPA in 1990, it did not create a new network of USDA
certifying agents."' Instead, Congress decided to utilize the then-existing private
certification programs, "allowing those independent third parties to become
accredited and certify operations in the field."'16 Unlike federal agencies, certifying
agents are privately owned and independent economic entities. To preserve their
own credibility and market viability, certifying agents have a vested interest in
enforcing OFPA standards. It is the certifying agents, not USDA officials, who
conduct the field investigations of applicants' facilities and production processes.
Due to budgetary constraints, the USDA does not have the necessary staff and
resources to conduct thorough reviews for proper certifications.' 7 In MCI, The
Country Hen concealed that it had been denied organic certification by a previous
certifying agent. Both MICI and the previous agent discovered the same
noncompliance-lack of outdoor activity for hens. The only effect the MCI
decision can have is to embolden applicants to game the system by shopping around
for favorable certifying agents until they finally acquire approval without
addressing their noncompliance issues. Certifying agents play a vital role in
safeguarding organic standards and their denials of certification should carry more
weight.
3. Residue Testing
Despite the fact that the OFPA focuses on production processes rather than
the products, the Act does "require periodic residue testing by certifying agents of
agricultural products that have been produced on certified organic farms and
handled through certified organic handling operations."'1 Indeed, Congress
realized the importance of residue testing while deliberating on the passage of the
Act in 1990. In pertinent part, the corresponding Senate Report explained the
rationale for the OFPA requirement of residue testing of organic products. First,
residue testing is important to ensure the "honesty of the system" and prevent
mislabeling.'"9 If the testing reveals any detectable residue of prohibited substances
13 Id. at 110.
... Id. at 111.
114 Id. at 113.
1 Id. at 109.
136 Id.
n See infra Part 2.3D.
138 7 U.S.C. § 6506(a)(6) (2006).
S. REP. No. 101-357, at 294 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4943, 4954.
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in a product labeled as organically produced, it would be incumbent on the
certifying agentl40 to conduct an investigation to determine whether the producer
has violated the OFPA and governing regulations.14 1 Second, the Senate committee
acknowledged that most consumers expect organically produced products to have
fewer residues as compared with conventionally grown products. 42 Accordingly,
residue testing is an important tool to "ensure that consumers are getting what they
pay for." 43
The Senate took a pragmatic approach in implementing the residue testing
requirement. While recognizing the importance of testing, the Senate had no
intention to make organic food absolutely residue free. The Senate committee
found that a product should not be labeled organic if it contains prohibited materials
at a level that is greater than what would unavoidably occur as a result of residual
environmental contamination." Prior to the OFPA, some states had very strict
requirements regarding acceptable residue levels. For example, New Hampshire
required residual contamination in organic food to not exceed 1% of the applicable
EPA tolerance level.145 The Senate maintained that the standard tolerance level
should adjust to developments in technology and knowledge concerning such
contaminants.146  Consequently, it did not set a specific level and instead
recommended a range from 1% to 10% of the applicable EPA tolerance level.'47 In
effect, the Senate left the question open for the USDA and NOSB to determine the
level of contamination to tolerate.148 The Senate also delegated to the USDA, the
states, and certifying agents the task of deciding on the appropriate frequency for
certifying agents to test organic products.149
Since the establishment of the NOP in 2002, however, the NOP regulations
have largely ignored the original intent of the OFPA regarding residue testing.'50
That is, the NOP regulations do not mandate residue testing. ' Instead, the
regulations have deferred the decision on whether to test organic products to the
USDA AMS Administrator, state officials, and certifying agents. According to the
NOP regulations, residue testing may be performed "when there is reason to believe
that the agricultural input or product has come into contact with a prohibited
substance or has been produced using excluded methods."'52 More importantly, the
140 Id., reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4943, 4955. "Certifying agents will oversee the residue
testing."







148 Id. at 4955.
149 Id.
Iso OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AUDIT REPORT 01601-03-Hy, supra note 51, at
2-3.
' Friedland, supra note 15, at 393.
152 7 C.F.R. § 205.670 (2011):
(b) The Administrator, applicable State organic program's governing State official, or the
certifying agent may require pre-harvest or postharvest testing of any agricultural input used
or agricultural product to be sold, labeled, or represented as "100 percent organic,"
"organic," or "made with organic (specified ingredients or food group(s))" when there is
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state officials and certifying agents who conduct such testing must bear the costs.'53
Clearly, the NOP regulations have substantially deviated from the OFPA's
requirement for residue testing. First the NOP regulations use the word "may" to
make the testing voluntary,'54 whereas the OFPA unambiguously mandates
certifying agents to test organic products on a periodic basis.' 5 Second, such
voluntary testing may be performed only when the officials or certifying agents
have reason to suspect the quality of an organic product has been compromised in
some way.'15  In fact, the NOP regulations inherently add another hurdle in the
guise of free market competition to dissuade the performance of residue testing.
Under the current system, applicants for organic certification pay certifying fees
and are free to choose certifying agents, thereby putting certifying agents in
competition to attract applicants.'17  As a result, certifying agents have been
reluctant to critically evaluate applicants for fear of losing business.' By leaving
the discretionary testing decision to certifying agents, who have no incentive to
perform the necessary testing, the NOP regulations have effectively eliminated the
residue testing requirement. Indeed, after reviewing the OFPA and the NOP
regulations, the USDA Inspector General concluded that the regulations are not in
compliance with the requirement of the OFPA.'"9 Therefore, it is not surprising that
certifying agents have rarely performed residue testing in the twenty years since
enactment of the OFPA. 60
The notion that organic products can reach the market without any type of
residue testing is probably inconceivable to consumers who strongly believe
reason to believe that the agricultural input or product has come into contact with a
prohibited substance or has been produced using excluded methods. Such tests must be
conducted by the applicable State organic program's governing State official or the
certifying agent at the official's or certifying agent's own expense.
(d) Results of all analyses and tests performed under this section:
(1) Must be promptly provided to the Administrator; Except, That, where a State organic
program exists, all test results and analyses shall be provided to the State organic program's
governing State official by the applicable certifying party that requested testing; and
(2) Will be available for public access, unless the testing is part of an ongoing compliance
investigation.
(e) If test results indicate a specific agricultural product contains pesticide residues or
environmental contaminants that exceed the Food and Drug Administration's or the
Environmental Protection Agency's regulatory tolerences [sic], the certifying agent must
promptly report such data to the Federal health agency whose regulatory tolerance or action
level has been exceeded.
7 C.F.R. § 205.671 (2011). When residue testing detects prohibited substances at levels that are greater
than 5 percent of the Environmental Protection Agency's tolerance for the specific residue detected or
unavoidable residual environmental contamination, the agricultural product must not be sold, labeled,
or represented as organically produced. The Administrator, the applicable State organic program's
governing State official, or the certifying agent may conduct an investigation of the certified operation
to determine the cause of the prohibited substance.
'5 Id.
154 Id.
' 7 U.S.C.A. § 6506(a)(6) (West 2011).
156 7 C.F.R. § 205.670(b).
1 Friedland, supra note 15, at 394.
158 id.




STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
organics are residue-free. Yet, a 2010 report by the USDA Inspector General
revealed that four of the largest certifiers, who oversaw almost one third of the
organic operations nationwide, had never done regular spot testing of organic
products for residues."' As a result, the Inspector General urged the USDA to
institute a residue testing program to help guarantee the integrity of organic
products.162 In fact, the USDA planned to require certifying agents to perform
random spot tests starting in September 2010.63 Yet, at the time of this writing, the
USDA has not released any details for standard testing methods. 64
4. Lack of Oversight and Organic Fraud
Since the NOP regulations were created in 2002, the USDA Office of the
Inspector General has conducted two internal audits to assess the effectiveness of
the NOP Office in enforcing the regulations.165 In its latest audit report in March
2010, the Inspector General identified several serious problems. 6
First, the NOP Office has failed to act appropriately upon a number of
AMS recommendations to take enforcement actions against operations that have
violated the law. From 2006 to 2008, the AMS found that five out of eight certified
organic operations it investigated had violated the law.'67 Notably, the Inspector
General report did not identify the names of the violators. One operation was found
to have knowingly marketed nonorganic mint under the USDA organic label "on 22
separate occasions and used a prohibited pesticide."6 6 As a result, the certifying
agent revoked the operation's organic certification.6 9 Given the willful nature of
the violation, the AMS asked the NOP Office to impose civil penalties on the
operation in addition to revocation of certification. "o According to the regulations,
"any certified operation that knowingly sells or labels a product as organic shall be
subject to a civil penalty of not more than $11,000 per violation."' 7  The NOP
Office, however, refused to impose such penalties claiming that the regulations did
not clearly indicate which agency was responsible for imposing civil fines.172 A
former NOP Office director revealed the real reasons for the NOP's reluctance to
enforce the law: The NOP Office lacked not only the resources to act upon such
161 Id
162 Id. at 18.162
William Neuman, U.S. Plans Spot Tests of Organic Products, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2010, at Bl:
"The inspector general's report said a review of four large certifiers, which were collectively
responsible for inspecting almost a third of the organic operations nationwide, found that none did
regular spot testing."
' Id.
165 See generally OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AUDIT REPORT NO. 0100 1-02-
HY, supra note 52; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AUDIT REPORT 01601-03-HY,
supra note 51 (discussing results of two internal audits of NOP Office in 2005 and 2010, respectively).
'" OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AUDIT REPORT 01601-03-HY, supra note 51, at
2-4.
161 Id. at 8.
168 Id.
161 Id. at 8-9.
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complaints but also the internal procedures on how to handle such complaints and a
timeframe to resolve pending issues.
Furthermore, the NOP Office did not even have a formal method to keep
track of complaints and violating firms. In one case, the AMS found that a
noncompliant operation, whose organic certification was suspended for violation of
the law, had continued to market fruits and vegetables as certified organic products
online.174 When the AMS referred the case to the NOP Office, it was not even
aware of the operation's continuing violations.' The incident demonstrated that
the NOP Office had no mechanism to monitor violating firms to ensure compliance.
In other cases, the NOP Office delayed actions against violating operations for as
long as thirty-two months and, during the delays, "the operations continued to
improperly market their products as certified organic."'
Second, in addition to clear deviations between the NOP's regulations and
the OFPA's requirements, the NOP Office has not even observed its own
regulations."' For example, the audit report noted that the AMS did not have a peer
review panel to scrutinize the NOP Office's decisions to accredit certifying
agents. 1 The NOP regulations require the NOP Office to create a peer review
panel, which is also required by the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)."9
This panel would be responsible for conducting an annual review of "both the
NOP's accreditation decisions and its adherence to the accreditation procedures
within the regulations.",o However, such a review panel has never been established
since the NOP regulations were promulgated in 2002."' In other words, the NOP's
decisions to accredit certifying agents have never been subject to any form of
external review for the entire time the NOP has existed. The American National
Standards Institute (ANSI) found that the NOP Office did not even have
"documented policies and procedures for managing the accreditation of certifying
agents." 8 2 When the Inspector General raised this issue with the NOP Office, the
NOP officials attributed the deficiencies to budgetary constraints and other
'7 Id.
174 Id. at 10.
17 Id.
176 Id. at 8.
'n Id. at 18.
178 Id.
1 Id.; see also Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C.A. App. 2 § 7(b) (West 2011).
(b) The Administrator shall . . . institute a comprehensive review of the activities and
responsibilities of each advisory committee to determine-
(1) whether such committee is carrying out its purpose;
(2) whether, consistent with the provisions of applicable statutes, the responsibilities
assigned to it should be revised ...
The Administrator may from time to time request such information as he deems necessary to
carry out his functions under this subsection. Upon the completion of the Administrator's
review he shall make recommendations to the President and to either the agency head or the
Congress with respect to action he believes should be taken. Thereafter, the Administrator
shall carry out a similar review annually. Agency heads shall cooperate with the
Administrator in making the reviews required by this subsection.
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difficulties in forming a peer review panel each year.8 3 In fact, the NOP Office has
never requested additional funding for the panel.'" The Inspector General
expressed serious concerns that the absence of a peer review panel would reduce
the overall integrity of the organic program.
Another example of unobserved regulations: For organic livestock, the
NOP regulations require "access to the outdoors, shade, shelter, exercise areas,
fresh air, and direct sunlight suitable to each species, its stage of production, the
climate, and the environment."'16 However, the regulations do not specify standards
for either the duration or dimensions of an animal's access to the outdoors. 7
Moreover, the NOP Office has yet to provide certifying agents with any guidance
on implementing the regulations' mandate for livestock access to the outdoors.' 8
As a result, certifying agents have adopted vastly different standards, if any, for
livestock access to the outdoors. Among four certifying agents that the Inspector
General audited, only one agent had a dimension requirement for poultry.' One
certified facility had only three hundred square feet of outdoor access for 15,000
chickens, while two other certified facilities had much larger pastures for outdoor
access and "significantly fewer birds."',8 Such obvious disparities in standards can
only compel a race-to-the-bottom problem. The facility that provides greater access
to the outdoors and the one that does not are both certified as organic, albeit by
different certifying agents. Consumers cannot tell the difference between the two
products on grocery store shelves because they are both certified organic and bear
the "USDA Organic" seal. Thus, the phenomenon of adverse selection ensures that,
in the long run, the facility required to provide greater access to the outdoors will
not be able to compete with the facility that can cut corners. In such a situation,
both producers and certifying agents have an incentive to keep lowering standards
in order to effectively stay in business.
Third, the NOP has been lax in regulating foreign certifying agents. The
NOP regulations require the NOP Office to conduct an initial site evaluation
"within a reasonable timeframe" after accreditation has been granted to a certifying
agent.'9 ' Such an onsite review is necessary for ensuring the accredited agent's
compliance with the law in its certification processes. The audit report suggested
that when the NOP Office conducted onsite visits, it often found noncompliance




18 Id. at 22; see also 7 C.F.R. § 205.239(a)(1) (2011).





' Id. at 28.
19 Id. at 28-29. NOP identified major noncompliances during the initial onsite reviews of seven of
these ten agents. Some of the major noncompliances included:
* Failure to identify noncompliances, such as mislabeled product and the use of uncertified
organic feed, at its certified operations (NOP regulations require certifying agents to have
adequate expertise to ensure its certified operations are complying with the regulations);
* Failure to maintain complete certification files as part of the initial accreditation process. (NOP
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certifying agents failed to identify mislabeled products and the use of uncertified
organic feed at certified operations.' It also found that some certifying agents
failed to keep all proper records related to their certification activities.94
Clearly, the NOP Office's site evaluations of certifying agents are
indispensible for ensuring the integrity of certified organics.' However, the NOP
Office has not always conducted the required site visits. The Inspector General
discovered that the NOP Office failed to conduct initial onsite evaluations for five
foreign certifying agents for as long as seven years after the Office conditionally
accredited the agents.'9 6  These five agents collectively certified 1500 organic
operations.'97 The NOP officials explained that they were unable to visit the agents
because their countries were under travel warnings issued by the U.S. Department
of State.'" To be fair, the NOP Office did seek advice from the Office of the
General Counsel (OGC) on whether it could suspend the agents' certifications
"because they could not conduct onsite reviews."'99 The OGC determined that
suspensions may not be justified because American tourists had traveled safely to
all those countries despite official travel warnings.'" The NOP Office nevertheless
refused to send its inspectors, claiming certified operations were often in remote
regions that were more dangerous than tourist spots.20' While the validity of the
NOP Office's claim has not been confirmed, one thing is certain-foreign agents,
never subject to the NOP Office's onsite supervision, have continued to certify
products, bearing the USDA organic seal, for sale and consumption in the U.S.
market.2 02
III. IMPORTATION OF USDA CERTIFIED ORGANICS FROM CHINA AND BEYOND
Currently, the USDA does not have up-to-date, consistent data on the
volume of organics imported from other countries. 203 However, USDA estimates
regulations require certifying agents to maintain all records related to their certification
activities);
* Onsite inspections and certification decisions being made by the same person (NOP regulations
require agents to ensure that the decision to certify an operation is made by a person different
from the person who conducted the onsite review); and
* Failure to maintain conflict of interest disclosures for all certifying agent employees (NOP
regulations require certifying agents to prevent conflicts of interest and complete annual
disclosure reports) (citations omitted).
Id. at 28.
19 Id.
195 Id. at 29: "Issues such as those described above can only be identified after the certifying agent has
actually begun issuing certifications to operations applying for certified organic status. However, as
described below, we found that the necessary reviews were not always being performed" (emphasis
added).
196 Id.
1 Id. at 30.




202 Id. at 29.
203 GREENE ET AL., supra note 2, at 8. Recently, the USDA announced a plan to track the import and
export of some organic products under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule. Tom Karst, Handling &
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demonstrate that the organic trade, like other areas of international trade, ran a
substantial deficit in 2002, with $1 to $1.5 billion in imports, but only $125 to $250
million in exports. 04 The Cornucopia Institute estimated that in 2009 as many as
50% of organic soybeans consumed in the United States were produced in China.205
Cheap soybean imports from China have had a tremendous impact on the soybean
farmers and soy-based food industry in the United States. According to the
Cornucopia Institute's research report, even though sales of soy-based food
increased by 29% between 2003 and 2007, acres of organic soybeans grown in the
United States decreased from 126,000 acres to 122,000 acres.206 Around the same
time, acreages of farmland certified organic in China increased by over 1000%.207
Facing a shortage of U.S. grown soybeans, leading soy-based food manufacturers,
such as Dean Foods, switched their sources to imports from China.208
In 2008, an ABC News report revealed that Whole Foods sold organic
products produced in China, including spinach, sugar snap peas, asparagus spears,
pine nuts, and creamy peanut butter.209 Consumers interviewed for the report were
most surprised that even Whole Foods sourced its organics from China.2"' These
products bore "USDA Organic" seals and words "Product of China" in fine print on
the package.21' Among the products, the "California Blend" of carrots, cauliflower,
and broccoli, under the "365 Organic" brand, was most confusing to consumers
because the packages highlighted "California" in bold letters on the front and put
"Product of China" in fine print on the back.'12  A consumer complained: "It's
definitely misleading. If they were proud of it being from China, they would be, it
would be prominently displayed on the front."213 The investigation depicted a sharp
contrast to Whole Foods' carefully guarded image of promoting "locally grown"
products, and it instantly drew a fierce point-by-point rebuttal from Whole Foods
posted on the corporation's official blog "Whole Story." 2 14 In its rebuttal, Whole
Foods strongly defended its practice of importing organics from China and assured
consumers that all the Chinese produced organics it sold were subject to the
USDA's rigorous standards, as a result of oversight by certifying agents.215
Distributing: Trade Statistics to Track Organic Food, THE PACKER (Oct. 22, 2010),
http://thepacker.com/Article.aspxoid=1275940&tid=&fid=PACKER-TOP-
STORIES&src=share visitor. These statistics will reportedly be available on the U.S. International
Trade Commission's website. Id. However, no such data was found at the time this article was written.
See Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, 19 C.F.R. § 152.11 (1999), available at
http://www.usitc.gov/tata/hts/bychapter/index.htm.
204 Id.
205 CORNUCOPIA INSTITUTE, supra note 7.
206 Id. at 16.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 17.
2 9http://www.wjla.com/news/stories/0508/521743.html ABC 7 I-Team Investigates: Organic Foods,






214 Joel Dickson, Whole Foods Market Responds to WJLA, WHOLE STORY (last visited Apr. 10, 1011),
http://blog.wholefoodsmarket.com/whole-foods-market-responds-to-wjial.
2'5 Id.: "Since 2002, the USDA's National Organic Standards have governed exactly what can be sold
as organic in the US-how it's grown, processed and handled-regardless of where in the world it's
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A. Importation of Organics
1. Three Ways for Foreign Products to be Sold as Organics in the U.S. Market
The OFPA provides that imported products may be marketed in the United
States as organically produced if such products have been produced and handled
under an organic certification program that meets U.S. organic standards.216
Specifically, there are three ways for foreign products to be sold, labeled, or
represented as organic in the United States.
The first is through certification by a USDA accredited certifying agent.
Currently, there are ninety-four USDA accredited agents, of which fifty-three are
domestic agents and forty-one are foreign agents."' Both U.S.-based and foreign-
based USDA accredited agents can engage in certifying organic products in foreign
countries. For example, of the nine USDA accredited agents certifying products in
China, one is from the United States,'19 and the rest are from Europe and Japan.220 In
2007, certifying agents accredited by the USDA certified 27,000 producers and
handlers according to U.S. organic standards: "approximately 16,000 in the United
States and 11,000 in over 100 foreign countries."221
The second way is through a Recognition Agreement under which a
foreign government may accredit certifying agents in its country to certify organic
products in adherence with the NOP regulations, which will bear the USDA seal.222
grown, INCLUDING China."
216 7 U.S.C. 6505(b) (2006).
See 7 C.F.R. § 205.500(a) (2011) (stating the general rule for the USDA to accredit domestic and
foreign certifying agents).
218 For a complete list of USDA accredited domestic and foreign accredited agents, see USDA
Accredited Certifying Agents (ACAs), USDA AGRIC. MARKETING SERVICE
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template=TemplateJ&navlD=National
OrganicProgram&leftNav=NationalOrganicProgram&page=NOPACAs&description=USDA%20Accre
dited%20Certifying%2OAgents&acct-nopgeninfo (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
219 The Organic Crop Improvement Association (OCIA) is another U.S.-based accredited certifying
agent working in China. In 2010, the USDA suspended OICA's accreditation for one year. For details,
see 3.1 C of this article.
22o E-mail from Mr. Samuel Jones-Ellard, Public Affairs Specialist, USDA Agric. Mktg. Serv., to
author (June 14, 2010) (on file with author) (identifying the nine other accredited certifying agencies
operating in China as: CERES-Certification of Environmental Standards-GmbH (Ltd.), Germany;
BCS-Oeko Garantie GmbH, Germany; Bioagricert, Italy; Control Union Certifications, Netherlands;
ECOCERT S.A., France; IMO-Institute for Marketecology, Switzerland; Overseas Merchandise
Inspection Co., Ltd. (OMIC), Japan; The Organic Food Chain Pty Ltd, Australia; Oregon Tilth
Certified Organic, Oregon).
221 GREENE ET AL., supra note 2, at 8.
222 International Agreements, USDA AGRIC. MARKETING SERVICE,
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSvl.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template=TemplateJ&page=NOPInter
nationalAgreements (last modified Mar. 11, 2011). For example, USDA recognition of India's
conformity assessment program, as authorized under 7 C.F.R. § 205.500(c)(1), states:
The Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) has determined the
following foreign government conformity assessment program sufficient to ensure conformity to the
technical standards of USDA's National Organic Program (NOP). These determinations allow organic
certification organizations in good standing, to apply the NOP technical standards to certify operations
that produce or handle agricultural products that will be sold, labeled or represented as organic in the
United States. Production or handling operations certified by an organization that is recognized under
these determinations may only use the USDA organic seal on their products when those products have
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Currently, the USDA has Recognition Agreements with Denmark, India, Israel,
Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. 23
The third way is through an Equivalency Agreement under which two
countries agree to allow products produced and certified according to either
country's organic standards to be sold as organic in both countries.22 4 Currently, the
United States has an Equivalency Agreement with Canada.225
The USDA does not recognize Chinese accredited certifying agents, nor
does it have an Equivalency Agreement with China. Therefore, the only way for
Chinese products to be sold, labeled, or presented as USDA organic is through
certification by a USDA accredited certifier.
2. Certifying Agents in China
Since certification is the only way that organics grown in China can gain
access to the U.S. market, the work of certifying agents is crucial to ensuring the
integrity of a majority of imported organic products. However, USDA audit reports
have revealed serious flaws in the work of certifying agents in China. Under
pressure from consumer protection groups, the USDA sent two officials in 2007 to
conduct an audit in China for the first time since 2002, when the USDA first
accredited certifying agents to work China.226 The officials audited four certifying
agents and two farms.227 Even with a cursory review, the audit brought to light
numerous noncompliance issues.228 The NOP Regulations mandate that inspectors
in the certification process "have sufficient expertise in organic production or
handling techniques to successfully perform the duties assigned."229 In reviewing
the work of the Institute for Market Ecology (IMO), a Swiss-based certifying agent
accredited by the USDA, the audit found that the lead inspector had very limited
experience in organic certification.230 Prior to joining IMO, the lead inspector had
worked in accounting, human resources, and technical documents management and
he had only attended four training sessions on how to inspect organic farms since
joining IMO. 231' During the audit, the officials found that this inspector did not even
been produced and handled in accordance to the NOP regulations. Id.
223 Id
224 Equivalence Agreements between two countries allow products produced and certified to either
country's organic standards to be sold as organic in both countries. Id; see also 7 C.F.R.
§ 2 05.500(c)(2) (2011).
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9 7 C.F.R. § 205.501(a)(1) (2011).
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understand the NOP regulations.232 In another audit report for Ecocert, a German-
based certifying agent, the auditor found that Ecocert did not provide the full NOP
Regulations to applicants.233 Since Ecocert did not even provide the organic
standards defined in the NOP Regulations to producers, it is very doubtful that this
certifier sought to ensure that certified organic growers in China would follow the
same standards with which American farmers are required to comply.
3. Suspension of OCIA in China
On June 13, 2010, the USDA suspended the Organic Crop Improvement
Association (OCIA) from certifying organic operations in China for one year.234
Based in Lincoln, Nebraska, the OCIA was one of the most active USDA
accredited organic food certifiers, certifying over 1800 organic operations in 11
countries.235 In 2009, the OCIA had certified 223 operations in China, accounting
for a third of all USDA approved producers in China.236  The reason for the
suspension was that the OCIA violated the NOP by using employees of an agency
affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection to inspect state-
controlled farms and food processing facilities. 23' These employees had an inherent
conflict of interest that made them unable to objectively certify organic operations;
objectivity is an essential element of the NOP.238 NOP officials discovered the
violation during a 2007 field visit in China. 9 The NOP proposed to revoke the
OCIA's accreditation but eventually reached a settlement agreement, under which
the OCIA agreed to suspend its operation for one year and promised to pay for the
NOP's field visit.'" If OCIA satisfies the requirements of the settlement agreement,
it will resume its certification activities in China in 2011. It took three years for the
USDA to reach its final decision, during which time consumers were kept in the
dark because the USDA conducted the disciplinary process in secret.241 In addition
to the OCIA, nine other USDA accredited organic certifying agents are currently
232 Id. at 8.
233 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., LIVESTOCK AND SEED PROGRAM, AUDIT, REVIEW AND COMPLIANCE
BRANCH, QUALITY SYSTEM AUDIT REPORT, NP7246EEA NC Report Ecocert Northeim Germany 6,
(2007), available at
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSvl.0/getfiledDocName=STELPRDC5071118&acet-AQSS: "The NOP
standards are not provided to all clients that apply for certification. The translated standards are only
provided to those clients that request the standards or that participate in training sessions. Those that
request the standards are provided only those portions they inquire about. . . ." (emphasis in original).







240 E-mail from Samuel Jones-Ellard, Public Affairs Specialist, USDA Agric. Mktg. Serv., to author
(June 14, 2010) (on file with author). In this e-mail, Mr. Jones-Ellard provided the original settlement
agreement between USDA and OCIA by email (Settlement Agreement-USDA, AMS & OCIA (May
28, 2008) (on file with the author). The Settlement Agreement states at I 4(g): " If OCIA is
reaccredited to certify operations in China after the settlement has been in effect for one (1) year, OCIA
shall pay for NOP auditors to inspect OCIA certification records and OCIA certified operations in
China for the duration of this Settlement."
241 Neuman & Barboza, supra note 234.
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operating in China.2 42  These agencies continue to certify Chinese products as
organic (i.e., stamping the USDA organic seal on products that are freely marketed
in the United States).
B. China's Regulatory Framework for Organics
In its rebuttal to the 2008 ABC news report discussed above, Whole Foods
tried to convince consumers that it was irrelevant whether their organic products
came from Chinese or domestic producers because both were subject to the same
regulations and supervision. 243 However, certifying agents working in China were
found to not even understand the NOP regulations. How could those agents enforce
U.S. organic standards in China? Whole Foods' claim of equivalency is at least
grossly inaccurate, if not misleading.
Even if certifying agents are well immersed in U.S. organic standards,
because the NOP Regulations only require agents to check certified farms annually,
the day-to-day management of organic farms is largely left to farmers.2" Sporadic
checks are hardly sufficient to identify serious issues, such as the clandestine use of
synthetic pesticides and fertilizers. Thus, even with certifying agents exercising the
utmost due diligence, there are numerous areas where the quality of organics
ultimately depends on the Chinese regulatory regime. For example, the NOP
Regulations allow synthetic materials on the National List to be used in organic
farming and handling.245 Chinese organic farmers are allowed to use these synthetic
materials too, but because organic farmers purchase their farming materials from
local chemical stores in China, it is Chinese regulations-not the USDA, FDA, or
EPA-that determine the quality of the synthetic materials and thus whether the
organic products will meet U.S. standards.
As a result, the USDA accredited certifying agents alone cannot ensure the
honesty of organic operations in China. The apparent assumption is that Chinese
governmental branches, such as the State Environmental Protection Agency, Food
and Drug Agency, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, and other
governmental entities, strictly enforce U.S. regulations to ensure organic food
quality and safety. In reality, Chinese governmental agencies face serious
challenges in enforcing their own regulations, let alone foreign laws. It is naYve to
assume that certifying agents, as an extended arm of the USDA, are capable of
supervising not only organic farming processes, but also the critical materials used
in producing organic food products, by visiting certified farms only once a year.
The suspension of OCIA's operation in China illustrates the limited benefits of
supervision by accredited certifying agents. Furthermore, the USDA has rarely
considered the impact of land tenure, water pollution, industrial discharges, soil
erosion, unethical practices, counterfeiting, and corruption on the integrity of
Chinese produced organics. Therefore, the inquiry of whether Chinese produced
organics are up to the quality required by the NOP has to be put in a broader
242 E-mail from Mr. Samuel Jones-Ellard, supra note 220.
243 Dickson, supra note 214.
2 7 U.S.C. § 6506(a)(5) (2008).
245 See generally supra Part 2.2B (explaining the purpose of the National List of synthetic chemicals
whose use is permitted in organic production, and the process for updating).
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context; the quality of organic production ultimately hinges on the regulatory
environment in China. Thus, it is necessary to examine the regulatory framework
of organic farming in China and the serious challenges that the Chinese government
faces in implementing laws and regulations for organic production.
1. The Development of China's Regulatory Framework for Organics
In the United States, the organic movement originated with farmers who
sought to capture extra price premiums246 while protecting their lands from
agricultural pollution.2 47  As previously explained, the OFPA was enacted to
harmonize organic standards that had already been in place in individual states for
decades.248 In contrast, China's organic movement originated with the government.
Chinese farmers, who only lease land from collectives, played no role in the
decision to go organic. Like other laws and policies in China, organic farming was
a decision that the government imposed upon farmers without consultation.
Traditionally, organic farming was the sole method of farming throughout
most of China's 4000 year history.249 This tradition came to a complete halt in the
1970s when the Chinese government followed the trend in Western nations and
embraced agrochemical-driven agriculture, a change often known as the Green
Revolution.250 The Green Revolution called for improved irrigation, hybrid crop
varieties, and an increasing input of agrochemicals, such as synthetic pesticides and
fertilizers.' Concerned with its ability to sustain a growing population, the
government firmly believed that the Green Revolution was the most viable
solution.252 Since the Chinese government had total control of rural land through
the system of communes, farmers had virtually no choice but to follow the
government's directions. For example, a farmer served 102 days in jail for resisting
the government's decision to abandon organic farming methods.253 As a result, the
Green Revolution spread to farms throughout the nation and quickly took hold.
The negative effect of the Green Revolution, however, began to take a
heavy toll on farmlands, the environment, and consumers. China's economic
reforms in the 1980s further exacerbated environmental degradation resulting from
agricultural pollution.' During this reform period, the government dismantled the
communes, permitting farmers instead to lease land from collectives and keep the
246 Friedland, supra note 15 at 382.
247 ORGANIC FOOD: CONSUMERS' CHOICES AND FARMERS' OPPORTUNITIES (Maurizio Canavari
& Kent D. Olson, eds., 2007).
248 S. REP. NO. 101-357, at 289 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4943, 4943.
249 ALBERT HOWARD AND WENDELL BERRY, THE SOIL AND HEALTH: A STUDY OF ORGANIC
AGRICULTURE 38 (1947).






254 Fang Yan & Chen Jie, Zhongguo Nongye Wuran De Xianzhuang He Weihai [Current status of
agricultural pollution and its impact in China], HUANQIU SHIYE [GLOBAL VIEW] (reprinted from
HONGQI [RED FLAG], Vol. 15 (2005)), available at
http://www.globalview.cn/ReadNews.asp?NewslD=5153 (last visited May 11, 2011).
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proceeds from their agricultural productions.255 Influenced by the Green
Revolution, farmers were reluctant to use traditional methods of organic farming,
which were more costly and less productive than chemical-based farming. In
addition, a younger generation of farmers grew up completely ignorant of the
organic farming methods employed in the past. Furthermore, the leasehold system
did not give farmers an incentive to care about the land, let alone invest in its future
sustainability. Consequently, farmers became more aggressive than ever before in
using agrochemicals to save on production costs and increase productivity. A
recent study showed that Chinese farmers use about a third of the world's supply of
nitrogen fertilizers even though China has only a tenth of the world's arable land."'
China has also been a world leader in making and using pesticides. Data has
revealed that Chinese farmers in total apply 300,000 tons of pesticides to their
farmlands annually.257 China remains one of the few countries in the world still
producing and using DDT, residues of which have been found to persist in the
soil.25
Concerned with overuse of agrochemicals, China's Ministry of Agriculture
(MOA) began to experiment with a return to organic farming in state-owned farms,
which were kept under government control even after the economic reforms of the
1980s.259 The Chinese government also started to advocate for organic farming due
to the increasing demand for organic foods in the international market.260 The
organic movement in China, therefore, has been entirely government-driven and,
like many other industries, predominately export-oriented.26 1
In response to the growing demand for pollution-free food both in China
and the international market, the State Farm Department, a sub-agency of the MOA,
proposed that state farms be allowed to specialize in "pollution-free" food.262 In
1990, the State Council and the MOA approved the proposal. 263 To avoid the
implication that other foods were polluted, the MOA changed the term from
"pollution-free" food to "Green Food."26 Notably, Green Food is not equivalent to
organic food because chemical pesticides and fertilizers can still be used to produce
it.265 The only difference between Green Food and regular food is that the
Government sets limits on the use of agrochemicals in Green Food production. "
The MOA later created the China Green Food Development Center
(GFDC), a new governmental entity in charge of the administration of Green Food
standards, certifications, and marketing labels.267 The MOA became the sole entity
25s For an understanding of rural landownership in China, see JEAN C. 01 & ANDREW GEORGE
WALDER, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA (1999).
256 Sternfeld, supra note 250, at 2.
257 id
258 id
259 Paul Thiers, Challenges for WTO Implementation: Lessons from China's Deep Integration into an
International Trade Regime, 11 J. OF CONTEMP. CHINA 413, 417 (2002).
260 Id. at 419-21.
261 Sternfeld, supra note 250, at 3.
262 Thiers, supra note 259, at 417.
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to provide the Green Food label. Thus, for an individual enterprise to use the Green
Food label, it must obtain GFDC certification.2 68 The MOA also created the China
National Green Food Corporation (CNGFC), a for-profit company, to monopolize
the export market for Green Food. 69 Thus, enterprises that seek to export Green
Food products have to go through the CNGFC. The potential for the Green Food
label to provide an increased profit margin soon attracted provincial and local
governmental entities to apply for the right to grow and market Green Food.27o To
enter the international market, the GFDC translated the term Green Food (Liishe
Shipin) into English as "Organic Food," 271' despite the fact that Green Food
standards allow for the limited use of synthetic pesticides and fertilizers. The
misleading translation attracted attention from international buyers who were lured
272
by cheap prices and a lack of knowledge about the Chinese system for organics.
It was a Chinese competitor that pointed out the discrepancies between "Green
Food" and "Organic Food" at an international conference.273 In response, the
GFDC introduced the Green Food AA-Grade label, which purportedly prohibits the
use of synthetic chemicals in Green Food production.274 In 2002, the GFDC
established its own organic food certification body, the China Organic Food
Certification Center (COFCC), which emerged as China's leading organic
271certifying agent. Prior to the COFCC, the State Environmental Protection
Agency (SEPA) had seen the commercial opportunity in the organic food market
and set up the Organic Food Development Center (OFDC) in 1994.276 The OFDC
was the first Chinese organic certifier to be certified by the International Federation
of Organic Agricultural Movements (IFOAM) and the International Organization
for Standardization (ISO-65). 2
With the varying labels and standards for Green Food, Green Food AA-
Grade, and Organic Food, even Chinese consumers are often confused about the
exact meaning of organic food. The "balkanization" of organic food standards in
China reflects the unique reality of a government-driven economy."' Each
governmental agency cashes in on bureaucratic power by setting organic standards
and granting certifications to farms under its own control.279  In fact, each
government agency acts as both the certification agency and the food producer at
the same time.28 As a result, conflicts of interest in the Chinese organic system run
directly against the notion of third party certification in the United States.




271 Id. at 420.
272 Id at 421.
273 Id at 420.
274 Id at 421.
275Sternfeld, supra note 250, at 5.
276 id
277 id
278 Thiers, supra note 259, at 419.
279 Id at 417.
28o Peter Thiers, China and Global Organic Food Standards, in AGRICULTURAL STANDARDS: THE
SHAPE OF THE GLOBAL FOOD AND FIBER SYSTEM 193, 203 (J. Bingen & L. Busch, eds., 2006).
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promulgated three major regulations to harmonize its national organic standards:
the Administrative Measures for Organic Product Certification (AQSIQ, 2004),281
Rules for Implementing the Certification of Organic Products (CNCA, 2005),22 and
the State Standards of the People's Republic of China (GB/T 19630.1-19630.4,
2005).283 In general, the Chinese organic standards are in line with IFOAM criteria,
Japan Agricultural Standards (JAS), and U.S. NOP Regulations.284 The inclusion of
international standards in the Chinese regulatory framework for organic production
is entirely intended to facilitate export.285 In practice, however, the implementation
of these organic standards faces serious challenges.
2. Food Safety Law in China
Unlike the well-developed regulatory framework in the United States, food
safety law in China remains in a stage of infancy.286 The Food Safety Law of China
(FSL) came into effect in June 2009.287 The Food Safety Commission, the chief
regulatory body, was just created in February 2010.288 Prior to the FSL, the
government relied on various ministerial regulations and rules to regulate food
safety.289 In 1965, the State Council promulgated the first food regulation, which
merely recommended sanitary conditions for food manufacturers.290 It was largely
ineffective for ensuring food safety because it did not set any standards for the
contents of food products. 29' The 1965 regulation was not subject to any changes
until after China's economic reforms in the 1980s. In 1995, the People's Congress
passed a law on food sanitation, which also proved to be ineffective in securing
food safety.292
281 Youji Chanpin Renzheng Guanli Banfa [Administrative Measures For Organic Product
Certification] (promulgated by the Gen. Admin. of Quality Supervision, Inspection, & Quarantine
(AQSIQ), Nov. 5, 2004, effective Apr. 1, 2005) (China), translated in www.lawinfochina.com.
282 Youji Chanpin Renzheng Shishi Guize [Rules for Implementing the Certification of Organic
Products] (promulgated by the Certification & Accreditation Admin. of China (CAAC), June 2, 2005,
effective June 2, 2005) (China), translated in www.lawinfochina.com.
283 Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Guojia Biaozhun GB/T 19630.1-2005 [The State Standards of the
People's Republic of China GB/T 19630.1-2005] (promulgated by AQSIQ & Zhongguo Guojia
Biaozhun Hua Guanli Weiyuan Hui [China State Standardization Admin. Comm. (CSSAC)], Jan. 19,
2005, effective Apr. 1, 2005) (China).
284 Sternfeld, supra note 250, at 7.
285 id
286 Chenglin Liu, The Obstacles of Outsourcing Imported Food Safety to China 43 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
250, 281-82 (2010) ("In 1983, China enacted a trial implementation of the Food Sanitation Law, in an
attempt to regulate the growing number of privately owned food manufacturers and vendors emerging
from the economic reform.") [hereinafter Liu, Obstacles]. In the United States, Congress passed the
Pure Food and Drug Act in 1906. The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act was passed in 1938. For
a detailed account of the food safety law in the United States, see Richard A. Merrill & Jeffrey K.
Francer, Organizing Federal Food Safety Regulation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 61 (2000).
287 Shipin Anquan Fa [Food Safety Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
Feb. 28, 2009, effective June 1, 2009) (China), translated in www.lawinfochina.com.
2ssWaidian Gaodu Guanzhu Zhongguo Chengli Shipin Anquan Weiyuan Hui [China Established the
Food Safety Commission], IFENG NEWS, Feb. 11, 2010,
http://finance.ifeng.com/opinion/hwkzg/20100211/1825676.shtml.
289 Liu, Obstacles, supra note 286, at 281.
290 Id. at 282.
291 Id
292 Id at 283.
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The 2009 FSL was the Chinese government's reaction to a series of food
safety scandals that greatly tarnished the image of made-in-China products.293 In
2004, more than two hundred infants in China suffered so-called "big head"
syndrome due to malnutrition, and at least thirteen died, after drinking baby formula
294that contained no nutrients. In 2008, at least six babies died and nearly 300,000
infants were sickened from drinking melamine tainted baby formula.2 95 The
melamine contamination was by no means an accident. A subsequent investigation
revealed that milk suppliers deliberately added melamine to diluted milk in order to
boost protein counts and deceive quality control checks.'9
The 2009 FSL overhauled the entire food safety regulatory framework. It
not only set forth food safety standards but also created a new regulatory regime.2 97
Under the 2009 FSL, the Food Safety Commission, consisting of three Vice
Premiers of the State Council, oversees the administration of the law.2 98 At the
central level, the Ministry of Health (MOH) is responsible for setting food safety
standards, evaluating food safety risks, and investigating major food safety
incidents.299 To enforce the law, the FSL also imposes duties on other government
agencies, including the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection,
and Quarantine (AQSIQ), the State Industrial and Commercial Administration
(SICA), and the State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA).3" At the local level,
the FSL puts governments at the county level and above in charge of food safety
administration in their respective jurisdictions."o'
The new law and formation of the new Food Safety Commission, however,
has not altered the public perception of entrenched food safety problems. A 2010
survey shows that food safety is the biggest concern of the public in China and over
seventy percent of people interviewed have anxieties about food safety.302 Professor
Chen Junshi, a member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering and the Institute on
Disease Control and Food Safety, was rather pessimistic about any improvement of
food safety in China. He commented, "It is impossible for 200 million small farms
which operate on individual bases to comply with food safety law and
293 There have been numerous reports on food safety scandals in China: David Barboza, China Office
Kept Arrests In Milk Case From Public, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2010, at A6; David Barboza, Recycled
Cooking Oil Found To Be Latest Hazard in China, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2010; Andrew Jacobs, China:
Prison Sentence for Parent in Tainted-Milk Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2010, at Al0; Eric Shlosser,
Unsafe at Any Meal, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010, at WK; Michael Wines, Tainted Dairy Products
Seized in Western China, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2010, at A6; Edward Wong, More Families in China
File Lawsuits Over Tainted Milk, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 31, 2008, at Al3.
294 Jim Yardley, Infants in Chinese City Starve on Protein-Short Formula, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2004, at
A3.
295 For an in-depth analysis of the milk scandal in China, see Chenglin Liu, Profits Above the Law:
China's Melamine Tainted Milk Incident, 79 MISS. L.J. 371, 371-72 (2009) [hereinafter Liu, Profits].
296 Id at 371.
297 Liu, Obstacles, supra note 286, at 281.
298 Id. at 283-90.
299 Shipin Anquan Fa, supra note 287, art. 4.
3 Liu, Obstacles, supra note 286, at 281.
3o1 Id.
302 Ouyang Haiyan, Su Feng & Li Yanan, Shipin Anquan Wenti Cheng Guoren Zuida Buan Jingchang
Jiaolii Zhe Chao Banshu [Food Safety Has Become People's Biggest Concern: Over Half of the Public
Surveyed Frequently Worries About Food Safety], XIAO KANG ZAZHI [XIAO KANG MAGAZINE],
June 30, 2010, http://news.eastday.com/c/20100630/ula5300771.html.
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regulations.,"3 03 Mr. Su Zhi, the director of the MOH's food safety, coordination,
and supervision division, echoed the same sentiment, pointing out that the Chinese
government faces serious challenges to regulate over 400,000 food manufacturers,
ninety percent of which are mid-sized to small firms.3" In November 2010, Mr. Li
Yizhong, the Minister of Industry and Informational Technology, admitted in an
interview with China Central Television (CCTV) that the public has lost confidence
in the government's efforts to ensure food safety.30 s Responding to a popular web
post that ridiculed the government's ability to regulate the food industry, the
Minister pledged to regain the public's trust but failed to provide a detailed plan on
how he intended to achieve that goal.3*
3. Melamine Resurfaced in 2010
Despite the new food safety law, food poisoning incidents continue to
injure consumers. 30" Among the numerous recent scandals, the most ironic one took
place in the midst of enforcing the 2009 FSL and establishing the Food Safety
Commission, when the notorious problem with melamine-tainted baby formula
resurfaced. 308
The public was stunned by the reappearance of melamine contamination in
milk products because the government had taken extreme measures during the
national crackdown in 2008. Mr. Zhang and Mr. Geng were sentenced to death for
making and selling melamine to milk farmers.3" Ms. Tian, the CEO of the Sanlu
Milk Corporation, was sentenced to life imprisonment, and other Sanlu managers
were sentenced to prison terms from five to fifteen years, for making and
distributing tainted milk."o In addition, the government recalled all the melamine-
tainted formulas and ordered milk corporations to destroy them."' Through these
severe punishments and mandatory recalls, the government hoped to show its
303 Id
3 Id.
305 Gongxin Buzhang Tan Chongshu Zhongguo Zhizao Xinxin Huiying Wangshang Liuchuan Yu [The
Minister of Industry and Information Technology Talked About Regaining Trust in Chinese Made
Products, Responding to Online Comments], SINA NEWS, Nov. 15, 2010, available at
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determination to root out unscrupulous food makers and regain public trust in the
food safety system. While the public was still wary about the food safety system in
general, it did not expect the same melamine scandal to strike again within such a
short period of time. The return of tainted milk suggested that government
regulation of food safety was completely broken.
According to the government order, milk producers should have recalled
all the melamine tainted formulas and destroyed them after the 2008 scandal. In
reality, however, the producers secretly hoarded the poisonous formulas for two
years and then remarketed them when the public horror over melamine tainted milk
faded away.' The repackaged poisonous formulas even passed quality checks with
provincial governments.' In 2010, melamine contamination was found in ice
creams, candies, yogurts, and other milk based products.3 4 The repackaged tainted
products were found not only in remote regions but also in big cities.' In
Shanghai, the most prosperous city in China, investigators found melamine in the
products of Panda Dairy, one of the most trusted food corporations in the nation."
The CEO of Panda Dairy admitted that the corporation purchased the tainted
formulas on the black market to save on production costs."'
To the public, the most unacceptable fact was that the Shanghai city
officials had actually known about the contamination but deliberately kept it a
secret for almost a year.3 ' In other words, tainted Panda candies circulated freely in
the market for almost a year during the government cover-up. Wang Xixin, a law
professor at Beijing University School of Law, commented that "[i]f Shanghai
Panda's crime is confirmed, the quality supervision bureaus, both local and
national, violated the law. [ ... ] The government hid the truth from the public and
312 Edward Wong, China Begins Emergency Check of Dairy Products, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2010
("The government ordered all suspect products to be recalled and destroyed, but some 'unscrupulous'
companies have taken the recalled products and repackaged them for sale . . . ."); see also Shanxi
Jingfang Zhenpo Weinan Wenti Naifen An: Qiye Siyong 08 Guoqi Naifen [Shanxi police uncovered
tainted milk case; the accused milk manufacturer used tainted milk left in the 2008 milk scandal],
XINHUA NET (Feb. 3, 2010), http://news.xinhuanet.com/society/2010-02/03/content_12925644.htm;
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safeguards], SHIDAI ZHOUBAO [TIMES WEEKLY], Mar. 11, 2010, available at
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behaved extremely irresponsibly to public safety."" 9  Another commentator
sarcastically opined that the eventual news release must have been an accident
because the government would have kept the secret until babies died from the
tainted products. 320  As of yet, none of the government officials involved in the
cover-up have been subjected to a criminal investigation.
The repeated milk scandals demonstrate three major flaws in China's food
safety system. First, local governments remain reluctant to obey the law, despite
being the primary entities responsible for enforcing the new FSL.32' Article 82 of
the FSL requires that local governments timely, accurately, and objectively release
information about food safety incidents to the public.322 The recent scandal revealed
that the Shanghai Government's first reaction to the new melamine contamination
was to cover it up due to fears that bad publicity would hurt the city's jubilant
image and booming economy. Furthermore, local officials were worried that a
damaged image would hurt their chances for reappointment and promotion.323
Indeed, they responded in the usual way that local officials deal with any potential
scandal, trying to resolve the problem quietly within their leadership circle even
though that might mean uninformed consumers would continue to feed their babies
with tainted milk.324
Second, the usually close ties between food manufacturers and local
governments greatly hinder the implementation of the FSL. Local officials depend
on the food industry to boost their local economies."' In return, food manufacturers
rely on local governments to provide a buffer of protection whenever their illegal
practices end up injuring consumers.326 Local courts and prosecutors have similar
ties with food manufacturers.327 In addition, the news media is under the direct
control of local governments.328 With the protection of local governments, food
manufacturers are emboldened and frequently put profits above compliance with
David Barboza, China Office Kept Arrests In Milk Case From Public, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010, at
A6.
320 Pan Hongqi, Yong Manbao Zhutui Ruye Huifu Wuyi Yinzhen Zhike [Covering up will backfire the
recovery of the milk industry], ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO [CHINA YOUTH DAILY], Jan. 6, 2010,
available at http://www.ycwb.comlepaper/ycwb/html/2010-01/06/content_706132.htm.
321Liu, Obstacles, supra note 286, at 285, ("At the local level, the new FSL places governments at the
county level and above in charge of food safety administration in their respective jurisdictions."); id. at
397-400 (arguing that local governments are reluctant to release information that could damage local
image and business); see also David Barboza, China Office Kept Arrests In Milk Case From Public,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010, at A6 (revealing that the Shanghai government kept food scandal prosecution
from the public for several months despite that the new Food Safety Law requires food producers to
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the law. Furthermore, the close ties between businesses and local government
officials are often tainted with corruption. In a most telling example, the former
director of the SFDA was sentenced to death for taking more than $850,000 in
bribes in exchange for granting licenses to pharmaceuticals. 329 As James J. Shen, an
industry analyst, commented, "If the head of the drug agency is corrupt ... you can
imagine how corrupt the whole system is."30
Third, food makers lack self self-discipline and any notion of professional
ethics.' Premier Wen Jiabao fiercely criticized the food industry for a lack of
conscience."' Unethical practices, such as using harmful chemicals and drugs to
enhance the look and taste of food, are prevalent in China's food industry.
Indeed, it is well-known that Chinese food makers employ the most unthinkable
means to adulterate food for economic gain. Adding melamine to milk is only one
of numerous food adulteration tactics. An investigative report by China Central
Television (CCTV) in 2009 revealed a number of horrifying practices commonly
used in the food industry.334 Multinational food chains that operate in China are
also vulnerable to using adulterated food ingredients, whether inadvertently or not,
because they primarily source ingredients from the Chinese market. In 2005,
Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) had to pull its popular hot chicken wings from the
market in China because the hot sauce, purchased from a Chinese source, was
tainted with Sudan Red, a cancer-causing dye normally used in the chemical
industry."' With the protection of local governments, food manufacturers rely on
adulteration to make greater profits. Such across-the-board violations of the law
essentially leave no room for any honest business enterprise to compete in the
market. At a trial arising from the first tainted milk scandal, a Sanlu manager
testified that if his company had refused to take melamine-tainted milk from milk
farmers, it would have permanently lost that supply source because other firms
329 Id. at 398.
330 David Barboza, A Chinese Reformer Betrays His Cause, and Pays, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2007, at
Al.
331 Liu, Obstacles, supra note 286 at 298.
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websites in 2008. As of publication, it is only available on a few websites outside of China.).
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would have accepted the milk regardless of the contamination. 16
The organic industry in China is not immune to the problems that plague
the Chinese food industry as a whole. More importantly, because most organic
products are produced for export to other countries, domestic consumers of organics
in China are few and far between and do not form the critical mass necessary to
exert any real influence on lawmakers and enforcement agencies. As a result,
public scrutiny and media attention are unlikely to create the same pressure on
organic products as on conventionally grown products, which the Chinese people
mainly consume. Therefore, organics produced in China are even less subject to
domestic regulations than conventional food products.
C. Challenges ofImplementing Organic Standards in China
1. Land Tenure and Farmers' Incentive
In China, farmers do not make the decision to "go organic," because they
are not the owners of the land on which they farm. According to the Constitution,
rural and suburban land, including house sites and family plots, are owned by the
collectives.' Therefore, farmers can only obtain use rights of land through a fixed
term lease from the collectives.
The decision to go organic comes from the township or county officials
appointed by a higher level of government.' The officials make such a decision
for the sole purpose of increasing local GDP on the assumption that organics are
more profitable than conventional products.340 Increased GDP is essential for the
officials to seek reappointment or promotion.3 41 As a result, farmers are completely
left out of the decision making process.343 Since land use rights are evenly
dispersed among farmers on a family basis, the officials require a large number of
farmers in a village to achieve organic conversion and economies of scale. Any
farmer who resists the decision will be forced by village leaders or township
officials to swap land with those who agree to join.343 Therefore, farmers have no
choice but to go along with the conversion to organic fanning. Through collective
conversion, family farmlands are joined together to form organic "production
bases."3 4 The county government appoints a manager to operate the production
336 Ye Tieqiao, Gongsu Jiguan Pilu Sanlu Yinman Shishi Zhi Dunai Wailiu [According to Prosecutors,
it was Sanlu's Cover-Up that Caused Poisonous Milk to Enter the Market], ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN
BAO [CHINA YOUTH DAILY], Jan. 1, 2009, available at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2009-01-
01/050616959786.shtml.
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bases and handle such issues as entering contracts with participating farmers,
selling farming materials, coordinating field inspections for foreign agents, and
selling organic products to foreign buyers.' Essentially, the various organic
production bases are components of a big county-run enterprise for which
individual participating farmers are merely workers. Because production bases are
village-based, there are a number of them within any given county. A study
revealed that even the county manager did not know specifically which farmers
grew under contract for him.'4 Only village leaders know the exact boundaries for
the production bases, but they keep this vital information from certifying agents by
refusing to provide detailed lists of contracted farmers or maps of the organic
fields .34
Village leaders are the primary point of contact for foreign buyers and
USDA certifying agents." When foreign agents request to conduct field
inspections, village leaders would provide "a few 'representative' farmers of his
own choosing."3 49 A study showed that randomly interviewed farmers told an
entirely different story."' During these interviews, the farmers claimed that:
"[T]hey had no contracts, that the factory [referred to by the county manager] paid
no more than conventional market rates and provided no organic input, that they
were unsure of the meaning of [organic food], and that they purchase[d] their own
chemical inputs on the open market.""' The same study also showed that local
officials used various tactics to disrupt the field inspections of foreign agents. One
common tactic has been for local officials to coordinate elaborate banquets and
sightseeing trips, in order to take up much needed inspection time.352 When the
agents requested access to workers and production sites, the local officials either
delayed the inspection work or provided ambiguous answers."
Even the most devoted certifier is not able to monitor all aspects of organic
farming. Sometimes, inspectors find it impossible to ascertain a simple fact, such
as whether a plot has not been used for a certain period of time. An inspector tried
to verify with a state official whether a farmer's affidavit was accurate.354 The
official replied, "I don't know. I don't care. [The farmers] asked me to stamp it [to
certify the plot had not been used], so I stamped it.""' The official's answer reflects
a common sentiment that local officials in China are reluctant to enforce foreign
laws. A study conducted by the International Fund for Agricultural Development
also revealed that some farmers clearly did not fully comply with organic
standards.156 According to the study, one major reason for non-compliance is that
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farmers are tempted to boost yields by applying chemical fertilizers, especially for
high value or rotation crops.5 Another reason is that farmers apply chemical
pesticides to deal with difficult pests or disease conditions.
The efforts of local officials to disrupt the verification process of certifying
agents serve two purposes. First, local officials spare no effort to ensure the
continuation of organic certification, which brings in a considerable amount of
revenue to the local economy. Because the farmers do not own the land, they have
no incentive to make long-term investments in the land. To increase output,
farmers clandestinely use prohibited pesticides and fertilizers. An inspection
unaccompanied with local officials might reveal this practice and result in
decertification. Second, local officials not only manage organic production bases
but also act as sales agents for the products. Farmers, who operate on individual
family bases, lack a sophisticated network for market access. Thus, local officials
are the only conduit by which farmers can access the foreign market. These
officials fear that direct contact between farmers and foreign buyers, or certifying
agents, would lead to the disclosure of the profit margins that the officials keep
from the farmers on the sales of their products. 9
2. Excessive Use of Synthetic Pesticides and Fertilizers
Agriculture was an important part of China's ancient civilization."o Up
until the economic reforms in the 1980s, the great majority of Chinese people were
farmers."' Agriculture was the major economic sector and close to 90% of the
populace was engaged in agrarian affairs.362 Throughout Chinese history, farmers
developed a set of outstanding techniques to cultivate their fields and keep them
continuously fertile for 4000 years.6 The key to these techniques was organic
farming. Many years ago, commentators observed that the "Chinese pay great
attention to the making of the compost, every twig, every dead leaf, every unused
stalk is gathered up and every bit of animal excreta and the urine, together with all
the wastes of human population, are incorporated." 3
Unfortunately, China moved away from its tradition of organic farming
when the government called for the use of synthetic fertilizers and pesticides in the
1960s. In the beginning, farmers adamantly refused to give up their traditional
farming techniques." With the socialization of farmlands, however, farmers no
longer owned their lands and had no choice but to adopt the "advanced" methods of
farming that the government advocated. In addition to compelling farmers to use
these new techniques, the government subsidized the cost of synthetic fertilizers
35s Id.
35 id.
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and pesticides.36 Because wide adoption of synthetic substances resulted in high
productivity levels and savings on the cost of labor resources, the government
largely ignored the potential harm that the substances brought to the soil. In the
early stage of the resulting economic boom, Professor Smil, a prominent soil
scientist, wamed:
Many recent cropping practices are seriously degrading the previously
good or excellent soils . . .. Crops grown in these degrading soils, shallow
and deficient in organic matter do not respond to . .. chemical fertilizer
inputs. The improper application of synthetic fertilizers and lower
quantities of organic fertilizer ... have greatly accelerated soil
degradation.
Despite the warning, Chinese agriculture went down an irreversible path.
Now, China is the largest chemical fertilizer user in the world "with an average use
of 290 to 400 kg of nitrogen per [hectare] in 1996, and applications exceeding 500
kg nitrogen per [hectare] in some vegetables [sic] growing areas."6  China is also
one of the largest producers and users of pesticides in the world. 6' As a result of
the overuse of chemical fertilizers over several decades, the chemically induced
high productivity levels began to decline, because the soil quality had deteriorated
severely.O Pesticide overuse has been linked to the disappearance of the natural
enemies of some pests, which in turn has caused devastating pest outbreaks.' To
combat these pest outbreaks, farmers have used even more pesticides. The vicious
cycle is hard to break when pesticides are cheap and regulations on pesticide use are
lax.
Past abuse of synthetic pesticides and fertilizers is not the only cause of
soil contamination. Unscrupulous farmers deliberately apply toxic pesticides and
fertilizers to the soil in order to increase productivity or to make products appear
more appealing to consumers.3 72  Despite the government's repeated campaigns
against toxic pesticides, food poisoning incidents resulting from their use are a
frequent occurrence. In January 2010, Wuhan city inspectors found that cowpeas
grown in Hainan were tainted with Isocarbophos, an extremely toxic pesticide. 73
Even though the Chinese government had banned the use of Isocarbophos because
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of its high toxicity, farmers could easily get Isocarbophos products from local
vendors anyway. 4 This revelation set off a wave of panic across the country
because Hainan produced most of the nation's cowpeas during the winter, and
cowpeas were one of most popular vegetables in China.3" The government recalled
the tainted cowpeas but did not close the shops that sold the banned pesticides."'
Three months later, the use of similar pesticides reappeared, and nine people were
hospitalized after eating chives tainted with organophosphorus insecticide.7 A test
revealed that the amount of organophosphorus insecticide residue on the chives was
sixty four percent greater than the amount allowed by the state standard.7
Excessive use of agrochemicals in the past thirty years has permanently
damaged the soil all across China.79 A recent report published in the Journal of
Science reveals that the soil pH in major croplands in China has declined
significantly from 0.13 units in the 1980s to 0.8 units in the 2000s.so Such a
dramatic decrease in pH would normally take hundreds of thousands of years.
Heavily acidified soil not only makes crops prone to diseases and pests but also
prompts the leaching of toxic metals into nearby bodies of water, "[s]o when pH
values plunge, as they have in China, scientists start to worry."382 Fred Gale, a
senior USDA economist, concluded that it was "almost impossible to grow truly
organic food in China."83
3. Water and Soil Pollution
The quality of organic production is highly dependent on the purity of
water and soil. Both the OFPA and the NOP regulations require organic producers
to maintain water and soil quality.'8 In China, however, heavy metals and other
harmful chemical pollutants present in the water have seriously affected the quality
of agricultural products. 85  The major sources of pollution are discharges of
industrial and domestic wastewater, indiscriminate solid waste disposal, and











383 Lavigne, supra note 354.
See National Organic Program, 40 C.F.R. § 205.203 (2011); 7 U.S.C. § 6513 (2006).
3ss Chi Fengling, Qiantan Shui Wuran Dui Woguo Shipin Anquan de Yinxiang Ji Jiejue Duice
[Preliminary analysis of the impact of water pollution on food safety and solution], ZHONGGUO SHIPIN
YU YINGYANG [JOURNAL OF CHINA FOOD AND NuTRION], 2006/5, available at
http://www.sfncc.org.cn/Article-Print.asp?ArticlelD=1584.
3 THE WORLD BANK, COST OF POLLUTION IN CHINA: ECONOMIC ESTIMATES OF PHYSICAL




Is "USDA ORGANIC" A Seal of Deceit?
a joint study by the United Nations Development and Environment Program
(UNDP) and the Chinese government, "only five percent of household sewage and
seventeen percent of industrial waste are properly treated prior to discharge."8 A
study by the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) revealed a bleak
outlook of China's water systems: Seven of the nine lakes under its surveillance
were dangerous "to human skin on contact."' On February 9, 2010, the Chinese
government released a new environmental survey, in which the government
admitted that water pollution was much more serious than it previously reported."
The government explained that the previous report did not take into account the
effects of agricultural pollution.'"
Unsurprisingly, water quality in the Yangtze River has deteriorated
dramatically with the rapid economic growth of China. The Yangtze is the longest
river in China serving as a water source for 186 cities and a food source for nearly
one-third of the Chinese population.' In fact, this river is the only source of
drinking water for Shanghai, which has a population of over 20 million people.392 It
is also a major source of economic growth producing over 40% of China's GDP
and hosting 50% of China's chemical plants.9 In 2008, 21 billion tons of
wastewater flowed into the Yangtze, 70% of which came from chemical plants.
Unlike many other industrial countries, where the production and use of hazardous
chemicals such as alkylphenols and perfluorinated comp compounds (PFCs) have
been greatly reduced, China's production and use of harmful chemicals has
continued to rise.'9 Studies revealed the presence of hazardous chemicals in wild
fish found in the Yangtze.'9 Despite the deteriorating water quality, "[t]he Yangtze
basin contributes nearly half of China's crop production, including more than two-
thirds of the total volume of rice. Among the other crops grown are cotton, wheat,
barley, corn (maize), beans, and hemp."
In remote regions, groundwater is an important water source for
agricultural use. However, groundwater is not immune to industrial pollution.
Groundwater accounts for one third of the total water resources and provides fresh
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Pollution Prevention in Post-Mao Industrial China, 18 COLO. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 267, 280 (2007)
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unwillingness to disrupt economic growth, combined with corruption and local protectionism, has
precluded China from fully complying with its international treaty obligations and enforcing its
domestic environmental laws.").
Sun Xiaobua, Ban Slapped on Polluting Cities, Zones, CHINA DAILY, July 4, 2007, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-07/04/content_909239.htm.
389 Jonathan Ansfield & Keith Bradsher, China Gives Fuller View of Pollution In Its Waters, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, at A9.
3 Emma Graham-Harrison, China's Water Pollution Level Higher than Estimated in 2007, WASH.
POST., Feb.10, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/02/09/AR2010020903572.html.
3 See GREENPEACE, SWIMMING IN POISON: AN ANALYSIS OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS IN YANGTZE
RIVER FISH 12 (2010).
392 Id.
394 Id.
39s Id. at 6.
396 Id.
3 Yangtze River, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/651857/Yangtze-River (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
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water for 70% of the population in China, especially in rural areas."' An official
study by the Chinese government shows that 90% of ground water in China is
polluted.3" The study indicates that agrochemical and industrial waste are the
major sources of pollution.40 It also links heavy metals found in ground water to
increased rates of cancer, infertility, and birth defects in rural regions. 40'
4. Organic Fraud and Counterfeiting402
Fraud is a rampant problem that challenges the Chinese manufacturing
industry." Likewise, organic fraud is the most serious problem facing the domestic
organic industry in China.4 4 A study shows that seventy five percent of consumers
surveyed have no confidence in domestic organic products. 405 In 2006, Wal-Mart
stores in China had to pull fresh organic produce from their shelves because a
surprise inspection revealed that the produce from a trusted farm based in Beijing
was actually treated with pesticides.406
On December 15, 2005, an investigation brought to light that the Jiahe
Agricultural Technology Development Corporation (Jiahe) deliberately labeled its
conventionally grown produce as "Green Food" for at least two years. In the
investigation, Jiahe managers admitted that, due to the Jiahe brand's popularity, the
corporation was no longer able to meet the growing demand for its products. 407 As
a result, the company began to label conventionally grown produce as "Green
Food" and to deliver this mislabeled produce to grocery stores.408 Further
investigation revealed that Jiahe itself did not even have government approval to
produce Green Food.409 In fact, Jiahe obtained its Green Food certification and
390 Nian Yifeng, Diaocha Xianshi Zhongguo Dixiashui Wuran Yanzhong Nongcun Ren Shouhai Zui
Zhiie [Study reveals serious pollution in groundwater, which directly harms rural residents], XINHUA
NET, Sept. 8, 2010, http://nc.people.com.cn/GB/12670784.html.




402See generally Qiu Chongzhi & Yang Yi, Jiyu Shipin Anquan de Xiaofei Xingwei Fenxi [Consumer
Behavior Analysis with Regard to Food Safety], 36(8) ANHUI NONGYE KEXUE [J. OF ANHUI AGRIC.
SCI.], 3432, 3433 (2008) (arguing that prevalent fake and shoddy food products discourage consumer
spending on food); Zeng Yanchu, Xia Wei & Huang Bo, Xiaofeizhe Dui Lvse Shipin de Goumai yu
Renzhi Shuiping Jiqi Yingxiang Yingshu [Factors Affecting Consumers' Purchase and Cognition of
Green Foods] 23 XIAOFEI JINGn [CONSUMER ECON.] 38, 42 (2007) (noting that "half of the consumers
surveyed have no confidence in authenticity of green food.").
4
3Mark Alan Kastel, Wal-Mart: The Nation's Largest Grocer Rolls-out Organic Products-Market
Expansion or Market Delusion? THE CORNUCOPIA INSTITUTE REPORT, Sept. 27, 2006, at 8.
404Chi-Chu Tschang, Organic, With Pesticides (Extended), BUSINESSWEEK, July 30, 2007, available
at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07 31/b4044062.htm (Professor Thiers pointed
out, "The problem with the domestic market is that Chinese consumers don't believe in certification.
They don't believe in the integrity of what they see.").
405Yang Xiaoli & Jing Zaifang, Shenyang Shi Lyse Shipin Yingxiao Xianzhuang ji Wenti Fenxi
[Analysis of green food sales and challenges in Shenyang], ZHONGGUO SHIwU YU YINGYANG
[CHINESE FOOD AND NUTRITION], (2005). A survey shows that only one fourth of consumers surveyed
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serial numbers from another company approved by the Ministry of Agriculture.410
The Jiahe scandal illustrates deep flaws in China's regulatory system for
organics. Under current law, multiple departments are in charge of regulating
Green Food products. The Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for approval; the
Industrial and Commercial Administration is responsible for registration of Green
Food certifications; the Quality Control Department ensures that Green Food
producers follow proper procedures in production; the Food and Drug Agencies
ensure that the end products comply with state standards; and the State
Development and Reform Commission is responsible for supervising green food
certification.411 Jiahe would not have been able to mislabel its products for two
years if any of the governmental agencies had exercised due diligence. Ironically,
the Director of the GFDC said that because Jiahe obtained its Green Food
certification and labels through fraudulent means, it was in fact not a registered
Green Food producer, and therefore, GFDC had no jurisdiction to apply any
sanctions against Jiahe.412
In addition, the distributors-Wal-Mart, Carrefour, and other grocery
chains-were negligent in marketing Jiahe products without verification. However,
there is no effective means to hold distributors liable under current Chinese law.
Article 49 of the Law on Consumer Protection provides:
Business operators who engaged in fraudulent activities in supplying
commodities or rendering services shall, on the demand of the consumers,
increase the compensation for victims' losses; the increased amount of the
compensations shall be two times the cost that the consumer paid for the
commodities purchased or services received.413
Article 49 bases the double payment on what the plaintiff paid for goods or
services, not on the compensatory damages caused by the defendant. In the Jiahe
scandal, even if consumers were allowed to recover double damages under Article
49, they could only be paid twice the amount they paid for the items they purchased
from the grocery stores, not twice the amount of compensatory damages. Thus, the
so-called double damages provision does very little to punish wrongful conduct.
In December 2005, Mr. Chen Zhiwei sued seventeen enterprises in various
courts for misusing Green Food labels and defrauding consumers.414 One court
ruled that the producer and Wal-Mart were jointly and severally liable and paid Mr.
Chen RMB15.5 (U.S. $2) for a refund and RMB15.5 (U.S. $2) in compensation.415
Obviously, the negligible amount of compensation was inadequate to deter the
wrongdoing of the unscrupulous producers and the stores that carried their products.




413 Xiaofei Zhe Quanyi Baohu Fa [Law on Consumer Protection] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat'1 People's Cong., Oct. 31, 1993, effective Jan. 1, 1994), translated in www.lawinfochina.com.
414 Li Yuanfang, "Lvse" Shipin Zaoyu Xinren Weii [Losing Confidence in "Green Food'], SHICHANG
ZHOUBAO, Dec. 15, 2005, available at http://www.cb-h.com/2008/shshshow.asp?n-id=22670.
415 id.
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Vanguard that he clearly knew were fake "Green Food.""' He sued the two grocery
giants at Luohu District People's Court in Shenzhen.4" Despite the fact that the two
stores marketed fake Green Food, the Court dismissed Mr. Feng's petition on the
ground that he suffered no actual injury.418 Furthermore, the Court frowned upon
Mr. Feng acting as a self-imposed private prosecutor and encroaching upon the
*419government's jurisdiction.
D. Beyond China
China is only one of over a hundred countries that export organic products
to the United States. The obstacles facing the Chinese government in regulating
organic production are not unique to China. For example, Mexico, Guatemala,
Ecuador, Thailand, Argentina, Honduras, and the Philippines all ranked lower than
China on Transparency International's 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index.420 All of
these countries are among the top ten suppliers of fruits and vegetables to the U.S.
market. 42 1 As in China, corruption and related issues in these countries raise a
significant risk that many of the U.S. food imports produced in these countries will
not meet U.S. organics standards.





420 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2010 (2010), available at
http://www.transparency.org/policyresearch/surveys indices/cpil2 010/results
421 RENtE JOHNSON, CONGR. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34468, THE U.S. TRADE SITUATION FOR FRUIT
AND VEGETABLE PRODUCTS 4 (2011), available at
http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL34468.pdf.
The following chart juxtaposes the data on imports of fruits and vegetables to the U.S. with the data on
co ruption in exporting countries for comparison purposes:
Top 10 Suppliers of U.S. Fruit % Share of Fruit and Corruption Perceptions Index
and Vegetable Imports in 2009 Vegetable Imports 2010 Rankings among 178
Countries (with 1 being the least
corrupt; U.S. ranked 22)
Mexico 34% Ranked 98 out of 178
Canada 13% Ranked 6 out of 178
Chile 9% Ranked 21 out of 178
China 7% Ranked 78 out of 178
Costa Rica 5% Ranked 41 out of 178
Guatemala 4% Ranked 91 out of 178
Ecuador 3% Ranked 127 out of 178
Peru 3% Ranked 78 out of 178
Thailand 2% Ranked 78 out of 178
Spain 2% Ranked 30 out of 178
Brazil 2% Ranked 69 out of 178
Argentina 2% Ranked 105 out of 178
Colombia 2% Ranked 78 out of 178
Honduras 1% Ranked 134 out of 178
Philippines 1% Ranked 134 out of 178
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these food imports consist of organics.422 Further, no extensive studies of other
countries have been conducted to understand the effectiveness-or even the
existence--of their regulatory frameworks for food safety in general and organic
production in particular. Therefore, this article underscores the need for further
evaluation of foreign food regulatory systems to ensure consumer welfare in the
United States.
IV. CONCLUSION: INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND THE USDA'S SIGNALING
EFFECT423
To a large extent, an unregulated organic market is analogous to Nobel
Prize-winning economist George Akerlof's "market of lemons" theory.424 In his
widely cited article, Akerlof employed the used car market as an example to explain
why some markets lead to lower quality goods through a phenomenon called
"adverse selection." 25 In an unregulated organic market, consumers have no
information about how organics are grown and whether chemicals are used,
especially in foreign countries. Organic growers, however, know exactly how they
produce their products. In the grocery stores, uninformed consumers cannot, based
on appearance, discern the difference between organics produced by honest and
dishonest growers. Dishonest growers can take advantage of this information
asymmetry and label conventionally grown products as organic. As a result, the
honest organic growers cannot compete with dishonest growers because all the hard
work and extra expense to comply with organic standards does not reap a benefit
from consumers. Because of the reduced production costs in disregarding organic
standards, dishonest growers can gradually drive honest growers out of the organic
market.426
One possible solution to this information asymmetry is to allow consumers
to acquire undistorted information about products from trustworthy third parties.427
Through field trips and inspections, third parties can observe production processes
and issue certifications that credibly signal the quality of the products. Following
the signals, consumers are able to tell the difference between the good products and
the bad ones. As a result, third party certification could increase the welfare of both
consumers and honest producers.428
Third party certification, however, is not a foolproof solution. For
certification to generate consumer welfare, Akerlof emphasized that "the certifying
establishment ... must be credible."429 If the third party certification signals the
422 See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
423 This subtitle is inspired by Gregory Husisia, What Standard of Care Should Govern The World's
Shortest Editorials?: An Analysis ofBond Rating Agency Liability, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 411 (1990).
424 George Akerlof, The Market For "Lemons ": Quality Uncertainty and The Market Mechanism, 84
Q. J. ECON., 488, 489 (1970).
425 Wendy Wagner, Using Competition-Based Regulation to Bridge the Toxics Data Gap, 83 IND. L. J.
629, 637 (2008).
426 Akerlof, supra note 424, at 490.
427 Cf Jonathan M. Barnett, Certification Drag: The Opinion Puzzle and Other Transactional
Curiosities, 33 J. CORP. L. 95, 101 (2007).
428 Id. at 100.
429 Akerlof, supra note 424, at 494.
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wrong information, consumers are plunged into a "second-order lemon market," 3O
in which consumers are misguided by certification and thus unable to make
informed decisions. Misleading signals generate an even greater loss of consumer
welfare than if there was no signal at all because consumers are less vigilant when
they assume the signal is credible.
In essence, the "USDA Organic" seal is a signal designed to guide
consumers to make informed food purchase decisions. The primary purpose of the
OFPA is to ensure "consumers ... get what they pay for."431 In practice, however,
this purpose has not been achieved domestically because of inherent problems with
the OFPA's regulatory structure, as well as the USDA's dearth of resources and
inability to enforce its existing regulations. Further, when drafting the OFPA,
lawmakers failed to anticipate the enormous impact that globalization would have
on organic trade in the United States two decades later. While the law has
significantly facilitated global trade, especially with regards to the importation of
organics to the U.S. market, it does not provide a reliable system to ensure the
integrity of organics from other countries. Under the current system, the USDA
does not exercise any direct supervision over organic production. Rather, it
accredits certifying agents, which conduct annual field inspections. In the context
of foreign organic production, it is common for a USDA accredited agent from
Germany to issue certifications in China. While outsourcing has become a norm in
global trade, it is problematic for the USDA to outsource its regulatory power to
foreign agents that it only audits once every several years.
There are two major flaws with the current system: First, USDA accredited
certifying agents are not subject to rigorous supervision. Because of a limited
budget and capacity, the USDA has failed to conduct timely inspections of its
accredited agents operating internationally.432  In the most egregious cases, the
USDA granted foreign certifying agents conditional accreditations based only on
paper applications and did not follow up to check on their compliance for up to
seven years.433 Functioning as an extended arm of the USDA, certifying agents are
the first reviewers of organic production. Any lapse on the part of certifying agents
will create loopholes for growers to cut costs at the expense of not complying with
the law. Second, the OFPA naively assumes that the accreditation-certification
system is sufficient to regulate foreign organic producers. Even if the USDA is
capable of exercising supervision of accredited agents operating in foreign
countries, the integrity of foreign organics cannot be guaranteed. This is because
the OFPA fails to take into consideration a host of relevant issues in foreign
countries such as China, including land tenure, pollution, and the regulatory
environment, which are far beyond the reach of certifying agents. Unless these two
flaws are corrected, the "USDA Organic" seal bears little, if any, value.
430 Barnett, supra note 427, at 101.
431 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4943. S. Rep. 101-357, at 289.
432 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AUDIT REPORT 01601-03-Hy, supra note 51, at
4.
433 Id. at 29.
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